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ABSTRACT
Shareholder proposals attract attention from scholars in finance and
economics because they present an opportunity to study both quasidemocratic decision-making at the corporate level and the impact of this
decision-making on firm outcomes. These studies capture the effect of
various proposals but rarely address whether regulations should allow
many of them in the first place due to the possibility of stock price
manipulation. Recent changes to shareholder proposal rules, adopted in
September 2020, sought to address the potential for exploitation that some
proposals create (but ultimately failed to do so). This Article shows the
potential for apparently legal stock price manipulation if shareholder
proposals remain relatively unregulated. We propose improvements to
decrease this risk of stock price manipulation, which should help the
government prosecute the offenders.
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INTRODUCTION
Holding stock in most corporations trading on American exchanges
entitles the holder to certain rights.1 Those rights include voting for board
members, voting on proposals for corporate governance changes, and
submitting proposals for a shareholder vote.2 This third right is of
particular interest because its exercise can bring the shareholder closer to
direct corporate governance than the other rights.3 Rather than selecting a
board member to act on the shareholder’s behalf, or voting on a measure
proposed by others, the shareholder can actually propose changes to the

1. See generally Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 407 (2006); HOLGER SPAMANN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, CORPORATIONS 43–60 (2018);
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971); Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d
651, 657 (Del. Ch. 1988).
2. See generally Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
605 (2007); SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1; Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439; Blasius, 564 A.2d at
657.
3. See generally CAM HOANG, GARY TYGESSON & VIOLET RICHARDSON, SHAREHOLDER
PROPOSALS: STRATEGIES AND TACTICS, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP (2016), https://www.dorsey.com
/~/media/files/newsresources/events/2016/10/shareholder-proposals---powerpoint-presentation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E3NB-9TZG].
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corporation’s business practices that others can approve.4 Whether these
proposals harm or benefit corporations has been a subject of much debate
in finance and economics, with several scholars suggesting that
shareholder proposals are harmful.5 Despite these findings, we are
unaware of any publications in law, finance, or economics that address
potential remedies for shareholder proposals designed to harm the firm:
our Article fills this gap in the literature.
The plausibility that shareholder proposals can harm a corporation
has many implications. First, this might mean that even well-meaning
shareholders should leave firm governance to board members and the
executive team those board members select. Second, these findings
suggest that investors respond negatively when receiving news of a
proposal, which institutional investors corroborate by frequently opposing
proposals not made by the board of directors or management team.6 Third,
and most alarmingly, the limitations on who might make these proposals
are remarkably few.7 The proponent must prove essentially three elements:

4. See generally Id.; SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1. See also Schnell, 285 A.2d at
439; Blasius, 564 A.2d at 652–57.
5. Compare Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 833 (2005), with John G. Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas & Irene Yi, Can Shareholder
Proposals Hurt Shareholders? Evidence from SEC No-Action Letter Decisions (Marshall Sch. of Bus.
Working Paper, Paper No. 17-7, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2881408 [https://perma.cc/6K2A9ZKF] [hereinafter Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals], and John G. Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas &
Irene Yi, Opportunistic Proposals by Union Shareholders, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 3215, 3215 (2019)
[hereinafter Matsusaka, Opportunistic Proposals], and John G. Matsusaka & Oguzhan Ozbas, A
Theory of Shareholder Approval and Proposal Rights, 33 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 377, 377 (2017)
[hereinafter Matsusaka, Shareholder Approval]; Vicente Cuñat, Mireia Gine & Maria Guadalupe, The
Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value, 67 J. FIN. 1943, 1943 (2012).
See also Matthew R. Denes, Jonathan M. Karpoff & Victoria B. McWilliams, Thirty Years of
Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research, 44 J. CORP. FIN. 405, 405 (2017).
6. See Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5, at 2.
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020); see also Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Statement by Chairman Clayton on Modernizing the Shareholder Proposal Framework for the
Benefit of All Shareholders (Sept. 24, 2020) (transcript available at HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/09/24/statement-by-chairman-clayton-onmodernizing-the-shareholder-proposal-framework-for-the-benefit-of-all-shareholders/
[https://perma.cc/5SUT-79C4]; Allison Herren Lee, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement
by Commissioner Lee on the Amendments to Rule 14a-8 (Sept. 24, 2020) (transcript available at
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/09/24/statementby-commissioner-lee-on-the-amendments-to-rule-14a-8/ [https://perma.cc/8AVN-RJND]; Elad L.
Roisman, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement by Commissioner Roisman on Procedural
Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 (Sept. 24, 2020)
(transcript
available
at
HARV.
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/09/24/statement-by-commissioner-roisman-on-proceduralrequirements-and-resubmission-thresholds-under-exchange-act-rule-14a-8 [https://perma.cc/YV5KW3NH]; Marc A. Leaf & Sarah M. Bartlett, Amendments to Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, FAEGRE
DRINKER (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.faegredrinker.com/en/insights/publications/2020/9/
amendments-to-exchange-act-rule-14a-8 [https://perma.cc/3664-MCRU].
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they own either at least $2,000 worth of company shares or 1% or more of
company shares, they owned these shares in excess of three years (or one
year, if the individual holds $25,000 of company stock), and they intend
to hold these shares indefinitely.8 Of course, the last element is remarkably
hard to disprove, and even if a shareholder later sells their shares,
the shareholder can simply claim that they changed their mind about
their intent to hold the shares at some point after filing the
shareholder proposal.9
Why is this relevant? Why should shareholders be limited in
exercising their right to govern the corporation directly? The answer is
simple: Not every shareholder’s priority is the success of the company.
The opportunity to manipulate stock prices could be more lucrative
for some shareholders than merely drawing dividends or growing their
wealth through capital gains, as current rules do not eliminate
the plausibility that some investors may hold both a long and a short
position in the same security. Where the short exposure exceeds the long
exposure, it would be more beneficial for the shareholder that the company
experience a bout of “bad luck”—and when the shareholder can cause
the “bad luck” by making unwise proposals that may lower company
value,10 the potential for price manipulation increases and should be
countervailed by regulation.11
To illustrate, imagine a shareholder holds $2,000 of Apple Inc.
(ticker symbol AAPL) stock in a Fidelity brokerage account, which they
have owned for the time necessary to submit a shareholder proposal.12
Simultaneously, the shareholder holds a $100,000 short position in the
same company in a Charles Schwab account. This shareholder can satisfy
the requirements necessary to submit a proposal to the company.
Then, the shareholder might submit a proposal deliberately intended to
harm the company, knowing that the proposal may lower the stock price
and increase the value of their short position much more than decrease
the value of their long position. Alarmingly, the current rules do not

8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
9. There is nothing in the statute forbidding shareholders from changing their mind about holding
the shares after filing the shareholder proposal. See id.
10. Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5, at 3; Matsusaka, Opportunistic Proposals,
supra note 5, at 3256–57; Matsusaka, Shareholder Approval, supra note 5, at 398, 408.
11. We suggest regulation rather than free market solutions because government has already
entered the field. If government agencies and taxpayer dollars are already being diverted to pay for
government regulation, we might as well ensure that the government regulates efficiently.
12. The necessary time to cast such a proposal with $2,000 or more in securities is actively
changing, so let us assume that the shareholder has met the long-term holding requirements, whatever
those requirements are. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020). See generally Clayton, supra note 7; Lee, supra
note 7; Roisman, supra note 7; Leaf & Bartlett, supra note 7.
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prohibit this action.13 While the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has recently released alterations to its rules that
might make transactions like this more cumbersome, the difficulty of
benefitting from an intentionally harmful shareholder proposal is not
greatly increased.14
Part I of this Article outlines the laws, rules, and regulations
governing shareholder proposals and the litigation surrounding them. We
discuss how lenient the regulation on shareholder proposals is compared
to the statutory, regulatory, and common law restrictions on what other
stakeholders may and may not do when governing or interacting with the
corporation. Part II of this Article surveys the economic and financial
literature, discussing the effects of shareholder proposals on firm value. In
Part III, this Article argues for additional regulation that would reduce the
possibility of intentionally harmful shareholder proposals and aid in their
detection. This Article concludes by demonstrating that excluding
intentionally harmful proposals will likely reduce firm litigation costs,
increase the chances that future proposals will increase firm value, and
punish nefarious activities by shareholders not acting in good faith.
I. LAWS, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
The laws, rules, and regulations governing shareholder relations with
the companies in which they hold stock arise out of the Code of Federal
Regulations.15 The laws, rules, and regulations governing the conduct of
board members, executives, and majority shareholders generally arise
from common law principles, state and federal statutes, and state and
federal regulations.16 State statutes and case law regarding stock
ownership and company incorporation do exist, but the primary guidance
for investors comes from the United States Congress and the
administrative agencies Congress created to oversee security trading:
primarily the SEC.17 Congress sometimes alters laws governing securities
trading and corporation management, such as when it passed the Dodd-

13. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
14. See generally Clayton, supra note 7; Lee, supra note 7; Roisman, supra note 7; Leaf &
Bartlett, supra note 7.
15. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
16. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 5–8; cf. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285
A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971); Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 654 (Del. Ch. 1988); Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721 (Del. 1971); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 175 (2d Cir.
1955).
17. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwe-do [https://perma.cc/S8Y7-8CRK].
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Frank Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.18 However, the bulk of regulatory
and enforcement authority falls to the SEC.19
A. Overview of Corporate Governance
We begin via an overview of corporate governance law to
demonstrate precisely where shareholder proposals fall in the grand
scheme of running a publicly traded corporation under United States law.
Shareholder proposals are hardly the main governance mechanisms
through which shareholders exercise control over their corporation; that is
part of why it is so surprising that the impact of these proposals can be felt
distinctly in firm stock prices. Nevertheless, shareholder proposals are
among the few direct ways that shareholders can influence the governance
of a corporation—ordinarily, they can only act through their elected
representatives on the board of directors. The empirical findings show that
this direct form of shareholder democracy can have a negative effect.20
Given the heavy regulations otherwise imposed upon corporate leadership
that we will discuss in this section,21 it would be inconsistent not to extend
similar regulations to activities by “activist” shareholders that can result
in stock price manipulation.
1. Officers, Directors, and Shareholders
All corporations have one or more directors, one or more officers,
and one or more shareholders.22 When a company has multiple directors,
they act as a group, known as a board of directors, which is the
corporation’s governing body.23 Directors appoint and supervise the
officers who run the corporation’s daily operations.24 It is through
directors that shareholders usually exercise control over the corporation in
which they hold shares: by electing the directors that most closely align

18. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(2002); Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, STEMBER COHN & DAVIDSON-WELLING, https://stember
cohn.com/practice-areas/employment-law-2/sarbanes-oxley-and-dodd-frank-whistleblower
[https://perma.cc/FN8H-SU8B].
19. What We Do, supra note 17.
20. See generally Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Opportunistic
Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Shareholder Approval, supra note 5.
21. See generally SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1. See also Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439;
Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 654; Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 721; Perlman, 219 F.2d at 175.
22. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 5–8.
23. Id. at 8; see also Powers & Duties of Corporation Directors & Officers, WOLTERS KLUWER
(2019), https://www.wolterskluwer.com/en/expert-insights/powers-and-duties-of-corporationdirectors-and-officers [https://perma.cc/N7AF-K523] [hereinafter Powers & Duties].
24. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 8.
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with their own interest in a type of representative democratic system.25
Typically, directors are responsible for making major business decisions
and advising officers, whereas the officers are responsible for day-to-day
decisions and implementing the board of directors’ policies.26
Major business decisions that directors are typically responsible for
(and which can result in their liability) include fixing executive
compensation, pensions, retirement, and other compensation plans;
deciding if and when dividends should be declared; and proposing special
corporate matters, such as amendments to the articles of incorporation,
mergers, asset and stock sales, and dissolutions, to the corporation’s
shareholders.27 Directors generally cannot take certain actions, including
amending the corporation’s articles of incorporation or sales of almost all
of the corporation’s assets, without first obtaining shareholder approval.28
Less important decisions, though, need not be approved by shareholders.
In the event the board’s conduct does not coincide with shareholder
preferences, the shareholders’ remedy is simply to elect new directors.
Company officers have very similar duties to directors, excluding, of
course, facing liability for setting officer compensation (unless the
executive is also the board member who votes for his own excessive
compensation).29
A shareholder is an individual who or entity that owns shares in a
corporation.30 Shareholders can be split into two types based on the types
of shares they hold: (i) common shareholders, who own shares of the
corporation’s common stock, and (ii) preferred shareholders, who own
shares of the corporation’s preferred stock (if the company has issued any
preferred stock at all).31 Common shareholders are the most prevalent type
25. See generally Powers & Duties, supra note 23.
26. Id.; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 5–8; In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 53–54 (Del. 2006); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710–11
(Del. 1983); In re Trulia, Inc. S’holder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 889 (Del. Ch. 2016).
27. Powers & Duties, supra note 23; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 5–8;
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 53–54; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710–11; In re
Trulia, Inc. S’holder Litig., 129 A.3d at 889.
28. Powers & Duties, supra note 23; see, e.g., Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635,
642 (Del. 2014), overruled by Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 195 A.3d 754 (Del. 2018); Glassman v.
Unocal Expl. Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 247 (Del. 2001); SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–
141, 194–312.
29. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–141; see also Schnell v. Chris-Craft
Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971); Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 654 (Del. Ch.
1988); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721 (Del. 1971); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d
173, 175 (2d Cir. 1955).
30. What Is a Shareholder?, CORP. FIN. INST. (2020), https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/
resources/knowledge/finance/shareholder/ [https://perma.cc/N6EY-TNZZ]; see also SPAMANN &
SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 5–8, 43–60.
31. What Is a Shareholder?, supra note 30; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 11,
at 47.
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of shareholder and typically have the right to vote on matters concerning
the corporation, including electing directors.32 In contrast, preferred
shareholders typically have no voting rights.33 However, preferred
shareholders are paid dividends prior to common stockholders and have a
preferred claim to company assets at dissolution, superior to that of the
common stockholders.34 Majority shareholders usually have fiduciary
duties similar to those imposed on directors and officers, but minority
shareholders share no such responsibilities.35
2. Governing Law
Generally, the state law (where the business incorporates) governs
that corporation’s governance activities.36 More than half of the
publicly traded companies on United States stock exchanges are
incorporated in Delaware.37 Moreover, approximately two-thirds of
Fortune 500 companies, including Apple Inc. and The Coca-Cola
Company, have chosen Delaware as their state of incorporation.38
Delaware has been the predominant choice for corporations since the early
1900s.39 There are several reasons why Delaware dominates other states
in this respect.40 The Delaware General Corporation Law, which governs
the corporations that incorporate within the state, is one of the most
“advanced and flexible” corporation statutes in America.41 Perhaps most
importantly, however, many corporations choose Delaware due to the
Delaware Court of Chancery, a non-jury trial court, which serves as
Delaware’s court of original and exclusive equity jurisdiction and

32. What Is a Shareholder?, supra note 30; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 11,
at 47.
33. What Is a Shareholder?, supra note 30; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 11,
at 47.
34. What Is a Shareholder?, supra note 30; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 11,
at 47.
35. Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 1955); In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder
Litig., No. 7144-VCG, 2012 WL 729232, at *9 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701, 710–11 (Del. 1983).
36. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 7–8; see also State of Incorporation:
Everything You Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL, https://www.upcounsel.com/state-of-incorporation
[https://perma.cc/FHM4-4ELU].
37. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 7–8; see also Alana Semuels, The Tiny
State Whose Laws Affect Workers Everywhere, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/corporate-governance/502487
[https://perma.cc/N2GF-5Z7A].
38. Semuels, supra note 37; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 7–8.
39. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 7–8. See generally LEWIS S. BLACK, JR.,
WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE (Del. Dep’t of State 2007).
40. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 7–8.
41. BLACK, supra note 39, at 1; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 7–8.
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adjudicates, among others, corporate law cases.42 Five justices—some of
the country’s most renowned experts in corporate law—serve on the
Delaware Court of Chancery.43
3. Fiduciary Duties
In this backdrop of corporate law, lawyers, and policymakers can
find many requirements imposed on members of a corporation.44 These
requirements are well-tailored to optimize corporate performance, and we
draw our inspiration for additional regulations on shareholder activism
from the existence of these requirements.45 In almost any context, the duty
of care, the duty of loyalty, and additional statutory and regulatory
authority govern the conduct of key figures in a corporation, including
majority shareholders.46 Yet, one exception to that rule is shareholder
activism: When it comes to shareholder proposals, these duties, or any
rules similar thereto, have yet to be applied.47 We will describe the duties
and legal regulations that place boundaries on the conduct of majority
shareholders, board members, and corporate officers and suggest that the
same spirit that gives rise to these restraints on corporate conduct48 should
lead us to restrain shareholder activism designed to harm rather than
benefit the corporation.
i. Officers and Directors
Directors of corporations have fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.49
Executives, board members, and, in some cases, majority shareholders
owe these duties to the corporation and its stockholders (though this
42. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 7–8; see also Semuels, supra note 37, at
5–7.
43. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 7–8; see also Semuels, supra note 37, at
5–7.
44. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (West 2021); SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note
1. See also Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439–40 (Del. 1971); Blasius Indus. v. Atlas
Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719 (Del.
1971).
45. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (West 2021). See also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN,
supra note 1, at 61–141; Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 239 (Del. 2009); Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (1985).
46. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–141; Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439–40;
Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 663; Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 719–20; Perlman v. Feldmann, 219
F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 1955); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (West 2021).
47. See, e.g., C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2021); Clayton, supra note 7; Lee, supra note 7; Roisman,
supra note 7; Leaf & Bartlett, supra note 7.
48. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–141; see also Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439–
40; Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 663; Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 719; Perlman, 219 F.2d at 176.
See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (West 2021).
49. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–141; see also Lyondell Chem. Co., 970
A.2d at 239; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710; Smith, 488 A.2d at 872.
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section will focus primarily on the duties of executives and board
members).50 Violation of these duties can lead to direct or derivative
lawsuits by stockholders on behalf of themselves, the corporation, or
both.51 In a dissolution or insolvency context, duties may be owed to
creditors, as residual claimants of value, as well.52 The fiduciary duty of
care requires that directors keep themselves reasonably informed when
making decisions on behalf of the corporation and make those decisions
in good faith.53 The fiduciary duty of loyalty requires a director to act in
good faith and in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the corporation and its stockholders.54 These duties alone
have attracted a tremendous amount of litigation and regulation—a quality
apparently unshared by shareholder proposals and the responsibilities of
those who submit them.55 Under the current law, something as basic as the
duty of good faith would not apply to a minority shareholder who
deliberately proposes a harmful proposal, even though this would be a
crucial element in determining liability of directors, executives, and even
majority shareholders (where applicable).56 While some provisions of
Delaware law permit these duties to be somewhat restricted via
modifications to a company’s certificate of incorporation,57 there are
ample examples where no such abrogation occurred and directors faced
liability for their actions.58

50. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–141; see also Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439–
40; Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 663; Sinclair Oil Corp., 280 A.2d at 719; Perlman, 219 F.2d at 176.
51. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–141; see also Lyondell Chem. Co., 970
A.2d at 239; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710; Smith, 488 A.2d at 872.
52. See, e.g., Huff Energy Fund, L.P. v. Gershen, No. 11116-VCS, 2016 WL 5462958, at *42
(Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 2016).
53. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Smith, 488 A.2d at 873;
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 53 (Del. 2006); Stone ex rel. AmSouth
Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
54. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82; see also Ivanhoe Partners v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1340 (Del. 1987); Blasius, 564 A.2d at 657; Guth v. Loft,
Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
55. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–141; see, e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co., 970
A.2d at 237; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703; Smith, 488 A.2d at 864; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., 906 A.2d at 46.
56. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82; Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1341; Blasius
Indus., 564 A.2d at 662–63; Guth, 5 A.2d at 510.
57. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (West 2021). See generally Lyondell Chem. Co., 970
A.2d 235 (discussing provisions indemnifying and holding harmless directors for any alleged breaches
of the fiduciary duty of care but not the duty of loyalty).
58. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–141; see also Schnell v. Chris-Craft
Indus., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971); Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 662–64; Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1971).
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a. The Fiduciary Duty of Care
The fiduciary duty of care requires a director to be informed of all
material information reasonably available before making a business
decision.59 The director, executive, or majority shareholder must act with
the level of care that an ordinarily careful and prudent person would use
in their position under similar circumstances.60 According to the American
Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance, the fiduciary duty of
a director is as follows:
A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the
director’s or officer’s functions: in good faith; in a manner that he or
she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation;
and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably
be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar
circumstances.61

In reviewing whether an individual bound by the duty has satisfied
it, courts have looked at the information available to a director and the
process followed by the board in reaching its decisions.62
In evaluating a director’s actions under the duty of care standard,
courts apply the “business judgment rule” when directors act with the
requisite knowledge, employ due consideration when reaching a decision,
and otherwise meet the elements necessary to justify the rule’s
application.63 Under the business judgment rule, courts will presume that
disinterested directors have made decisions on an informed basis with a
good faith belief that the decisions are in the best interests of the
corporation.64 The American Law Institute provides the following
definition of the business judgment rule in its Principles of Corporate
Governance:
A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith
fulfills the duty under this section if the director or officer: (1) is not
interested in the subject of the business judgment; (2) is informed
with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent that
59. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Smith, 488 A.2d at 872;
Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 652; Guth, 5 A.2d at 510.
60. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Smith, 488 A.2d at 872;
Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 652; Guth, 5 A.2d at 510.
61. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(a) (AM. L. INST. 2020).
62. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Smith, 488 A.2d at 874;
Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 659; Guth, 5 A.2d at 515.
63. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 818 (Del. 1984); Smith, 488 A.2d at 872–73; Moran v. Household Int’l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,
1350 (Del. 1985).
64. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Aronson, 473 A.2d at
811; Smith, 488 A.2d at 871; Moran, 500 A.2d at 1350.
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the director or officer reasonably believes is appropriate under the
circumstances; and (3) rationally believes that the business judgment
is in the best interests of the corporation.65

Individuals challenging board decisions can rebut this presumption
by demonstrating that the directors were grossly negligent in their
decision-making and thus in violation of their duty of care.66 In Smith v.
Van Gorkom, a seemingly earth-shattering case of business organizations
law, the Delaware Supreme Court held that even very experienced
directors who sold their company shares at a $20 premium over the market
price could be held liable because they decided to sell too quickly for the
court’s preference and without viewing enough studies of value.67 While
this was certainly the exception to the principle that the reasonable
business judgment rule ordinarily shields directors from liability, it
reminds us that even under apparently beneficial circumstances for the
shareholders (such as the $20 premium over market price), directors can
face liability for taking insufficient time to study company valuations or
to consider the impact of their actions on shareholders.68 We are aware of
no case even remotely similar that imposes a duty on an activist submitting
a shareholder proposal. Individuals submitting such proposals need not
even seek the protection of the business judgment rule because the
fiduciary duty of care under which the rule applies does not extend to
shareholder activists.
A counterargument can be sustained that the business judgment rule
ordinarily protects directors, executives, and majority shareholders and
leads to a dismissal of most litigation.69 This would mean that the litigation
threats these individuals actually face are not much greater than minority
shareholder proponents of ill-advised proposals.70 After all, the outcome
observed in Smith v. Van Gorkom is the exception that proves the rule.71
Under the business judgment rule, courts focus on the leadership’s process
in making a decision rather than the outcome of the decision, which
permits almost any choice made by leadership to withstand scrutiny as
long as the process of reaching it does not greatly offend the court.72 In
65. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 61, § 4.01(c).
66. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Aronson, 473 A.2d at
811; Smith, 488 A.2d at 884.
67. See Smith, 488 A.2d at 874; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–107.
68. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Aronson, 473 A.2d at
812; Smith, 488 A.2d at 890.
69. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Aronson, 473 A.2d at
818; Smith, 488 A.2d at 893; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 75 (Del. 2006).
70. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Aronson, 473 A.2d at
818; Smith, 488 A.2d at 893; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 75.
71. See Smith, 488 A.2d at 888; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141.
72. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141.
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determining whether a defendant satisfied their fiduciary duty of care, a
court will generally give deference to the defendant and will not substitute
its own judgment for the defendant’s, even if a decision turned out to be
unwise, so long as the decider acted on an informed basis, in good faith,
and in the rational belief that the decision made was in the best interests of
the company and its stockholders.73
If the plaintiff fails to rebut the business judgment rule presumption
and cannot demonstrate a breach of a fiduciary duty, the plaintiff will not
be entitled to a remedy (and the defendant will not be subject to reprimand)
unless the challenged transaction constitutes waste.74 To recover on a
claim of waste, a plaintiff must prove that the relevant exchange was “so
one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could
conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration.”75 This
standard is stringent, and the plaintiff can only prove waste occurred in the
“rare, ‘unconscionable case where directors irrationally squander or give
away corporate assets.’”76 However, recovery is still technically possible,
though not against shareholders deliberately submitting proposals that
would squander corporate assets.
Delaware directors also owe a fiduciary duty of disclosure as part of
their duty of care.77 The fiduciary duty of disclosure requires directors to
disclose fully and fairly all material information within the board’s control
when it seeks shareholder action.78 Directors further owe a fiduciary duty
of candor, also part of their duty of care.79 The duty of candor requires
directors to communicate honestly and to make full and fair disclosures to
their fellow directors and the corporation’s stockholders of all information
known to them that is relevant to the decision under consideration.80
Moreover, directors, executives, and other individuals owing fiduciary

73. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 52; Stone
ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006); Moran v. Household Int’l,
Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985); see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141.
74. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 74; SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN,
supra note 1, at 83–141.
75. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 74; SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra
note 1, at 83–141.
76. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 74 (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d
244, 263 (Del. 2000)); see SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141.
77. See Chatham Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Papanier, No. 2017-0088-AGB, 2017 WL 6550428, at
*9 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2017).
78. Id.
79. See generally Steven Smith, Duties and Liabilities of Boards of Directors, BUCHANAN LABS
(July
2,
2015),
http://buchanan-labs.com/duties-and-liabilities-of-boards-of-directors-2/
[https://perma.cc/VUE3-F6MQ].
80. See id.
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duties to the corporation cannot trade on insider information.81 The duty
of candid disclosure of such information to the public prior to trading on
it forms the very basis of American insider trading regulations.82 We are,
once again, unaware of any such impositions of duty on proponents of
activist shareholder proposals that promote drastic changes in the way a
particular publicly traded corporation does business, even if the business
of the corporation is generally good in its unaltered state.
b. The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty
Another duty not extended to activist minority shareholders is the
fiduciary duty of loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders.83 This
obligation is crucial in preventing majority shareholders, executives, and
board members from proposing actions deliberately harmful to a
corporation due to some potential benefit that might accrue to the activist
shareholder.84 Ordinarily, this duty might prevent a parent corporation
from taking advantage of its subsidiary by engaging in dealings that
would be overly beneficial to the owner company and detrimental
to the shareholders.85 In the same spirit, this duty, if applied to proponents
of harmful proposals, would be remarkably helpful in preventing
individuals from shorting the same company to which they submit
unhelpful ideas. Nevertheless, no such duty appears to apply to minority
shareholder activists, although it applies to majority shareholders, officers,
directors, and corporations that hold a particular company as a subsidiary
of their own.86
The duty of loyalty prohibits self-dealing by requiring officers,
directors, and majority shareholders to act in good faith and in a manner
they reasonably believe to be in the best interests of the corporation and
its stockholders.87 An executive’s, board member’s, or majority
shareholder’s own financial or other self-interest may not take priority
over the interests of the corporation and its stockholders when these
81. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980); see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646, 651 (1983).
82. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651.
83. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987); see also
Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510
(Del. 1939); SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82.
84. See Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1345; see also Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 663; Guth, 5
A.2d at 510; SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82.
85. See Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1345; see also Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 663; Guth, 5
A.2d at 510; SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82.
86. See Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1345; see also Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 663; Guth, 5
A.2d at 510; SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82.
87. See Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1341; see also Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 657; SPAMANN
& SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82.
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individuals make decisions on behalf of the corporation.88 The director
also has an obligation to act in good faith in the oversight of the
corporation.89 Perhaps the most important aspect of the duty of loyalty is
the difficulty of mounting a business judgment rule defense—the most
popular defensive mechanism available to parties sued in the corporate
context under a breach of fiduciary duty.90 While amply available to
defendants in lawsuits arising from an alleged breach of the duty of care,
this rule becomes much more inaccessible when the suit arises from an
alleged breach of the duty of loyalty.91 That is because a director’s duty of
loyalty is commonly challenged in connection with conflicts of interest
and corporate opportunities, as described below.92
1. Conflicts of Interest
A conflict of interest may exist when a member of company
leadership has a direct or indirect personal or financial interest in a
transaction or other matter involving the corporation.93 Individuals who
have a duty of loyalty to the corporation should promptly disclose potential
conflicts of interest to the board and describe all material facts concerning
the transaction or other matters that are known to the conflicted
individual.94 Following disclosure, an interested individual should not
decide on the matter that involves the conflict of interest.95 In some
situations, the conflicted individual must refrain from participating in
discussions or excuse themselves from meetings during the discussion.96
A majority of disinterested directors should approve transactions that
present conflicts of interest after full disclosure of all material information
regarding the transaction and the nature of the conflicted individual’s
88. See Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1341; see also Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 657; SPAMANN
& SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82.
89. See Ivanhoe Partners, 535 A.2d at 1341; see also Blasius Indus., 564 A.2d at 657; SPAMANN
& SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82.
90. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 83–141; see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 809 (Del. 1984); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1975).
91. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–141; see also Matthew Gensburg, The
Business Judgment Rule and Its Limits and Exceptions, GENSBURG CALANDRIELLO & KANTER, P.C.
(May 22, 2018), https://www.gcklegal.com/business-judgment-rule-limits-exceptions [https://
perma.cc/8TPV-FKAK].
92. See SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–141; see also Aronson, 473 A.2d at
814; Smith, 488 A.2d at 865.
93. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Del. 1989); Guth v. Loft,
Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 511 (Del. 1939); see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82.
94. See Mills Acquisition Co., 559 A.2d at 1280; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra
note 1, at 61–82.
95. See Mills Acquisition Co., 559 A.2d at 1282; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra
note 1, at 61–82.
96. See Mills Acquisition Co., 559 A.2d at 1282. see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra
note 1, at 61–82.
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interest in the transaction.97 Conflicted members of corporate leadership
have a duty to disclose to the board material information in their
possession affecting a board decision, especially where the conflicted
individuals have a personal interest in the outcome of the decision.98
Coincidentally, a conflict of interest may remove the protections of
the business judgment rule.99 The business judgment rule does not apply
if invoked by an interested fiduciary. Hence, if the allegations of a duty of
loyalty violation come in connection with some personal interest that the
accused could advance by acting inappropriately, then the business
judgment rule defense may be altogether unavailable.100 The potential
unavailability of the business judgment rule is why conflicts of interest
pose significant problems for members of company leadership despite
posing no problem for proponents of bad corporate policy who submit
shareholder proposals. Under the current rules, individuals who seek the
company’s demise face no liability for submitting proposals that might
lead to its demise as long as the proponent is not part of the corporate
leadership team.
2. Corporate Opportunities
The duty of loyalty generally requires that if a director gains access
to a corporate opportunity related to the corporation’s business, the
director must first make that opportunity available to the corporation
before pursuing it on their own behalf.101 Directors should consider the
following factors when deciding whether a potential business transaction
is a corporate opportunity: (i) the relevance of the opportunity to the
corporation’s existing or proposed business; (ii) the context in which the
director became aware of the opportunity; (iii) the possible impact of the
opportunity on the corporation and the level of interest of the corporation
in the opportunity; and (iv) the reasonableness of any corporate
expectation that the director should present the opportunity to the
corporation.102 If an individual subject to the duty of loyalty presents the
opportunity to the board and the disinterested directors disclaim interest in
97. See Mills Acquisition Co., 559 A.2d at 1280; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra
note 1, at 61–82.
98. See Mills Acquisition Co., 559 A.2d at 1280; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra
note 1, at 61–82.
99. See Westmoreland Cnty. Emp. Ret. Sys. v. Parkinson, 727 F.3d 719, 725–56 (7th Cir. 2013);
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001); see also Gensburg, supra note 91.
100. See Westmoreland Cnty. Emp. Ret. Sys., 727 F.3d at 726; Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d at
91; see also Gensburg, supra note 91.
101. See J. Leo Johnson, Inc. v. Carmer, 156 A.2d 499, 502 (Del. 1959); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5
A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180
(Del. 1986).
102. See Guth, 5 A.2d at 511.
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the opportunity, the interested individual may generally pursue the
opportunity on their own behalf.103 Board members are subject to the same
fiduciary duties as are officers, and the duty may extend to majority
shareholders as well.104
Take the case of Guth v. Loft, Inc. as an important example.105 The
case discusses what is now a historic event of the transfer of rights to
Pepsi-Cola.106 Guth, the president of Loft, received an offer in his capacity
to purchase Pepsi-Cola as a replacement for a deal Loft had with CocaCola.107 Guth saw the benefit in the transaction and the future proceeds of
Pepsi-Cola through its business with Loft108 and purchased Pepsi-Cola for
himself rather than on behalf of his company.109 Because Guth violated his
duty of loyalty and engaged in beneficial self-dealing as opposed to
bringing the offer to his company, the court forced him to turn over his
shares of Pepsi-Cola to Loft and any profits otherwise gained from the
transaction with Pepsi-Cola.110
A similar duty, however, does not exist for minority shareholders
who file proposals to change a company’s manner of business. Such
shareholders can, at least in theory, ask the corporation to engage in
business dealings that would forego valuable business opportunities for
that corporation, but that might create those same opportunities for the
proponents of the proposal. For example, proposals to engage in more
carbon-neutral processes for the manufacture of products, if adopted,
would undoubtedly aid businesses that specialize in producing
manufacturing equipment that has a low carbon footprint. Does it make
sense to permit members of the benefitting industry to purchase shares in
certain companies and then make proposals that those companies engage
them in one-sided business ventures? One might argue that this would
breach the fiduciary duty of loyalty if done by a director or manager of the
non-benefitting company,111 but because minority shareholders have no
such duty, they can make these proposals to their hearts’ (and wallets’)
content. In fact, if they are clever, they may submit the shareholder
proposals in ways that are not obviously affiliated with their carbonneutral-manufacturing-equipment business, hence removing suspicion in

103. Id.
104. See generally Powers & Duties, supra note 23.
105. Guth, 5 A.2d 503.
106. Id. at 506.
107. Id. at 506–07.
108. Id. at 506.
109. Id. at 507–08.
110. Id. at 508.
111. E.g., id. at 511; see also SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82.
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the eyes of the retail shareholder (and perhaps even the “smart money”
shareholder) that the proponent is up to no good.
ii. Shareholders
In contrast to the broad fiduciary duties owed by directors and
officers, shareholders only owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and
other shareholders if they are deemed a “controlling” shareholder.112
However, this is not a trivial imposition for majority shareholders, as they
can frequently face lawsuits similar to the ones levied against executives
and directors for a breach of a fiduciary duty.113 Nevertheless, unlike some
states, Delaware does not impose on controlling shareholders (and their
representatives in management) a “heightened” fiduciary duty.114 When
the “heightened” duty applies—in certain other states and in the Delaware
limited liability context—it requires the controlling shareholders to share
pro rata with the minority all corporate benefits.115 A controlling
shareholder is a shareholder who holds at least 50% of the corporation’s
shares and exercises actual control under Delaware law, but this concept
may soon evolve to include shareholders who control a sufficiently large
block of a corporation to be able to control its operations.116
Because minority shareholders do not owe fiduciary duties to the
corporation or the other shareholders, minority shareholders may act in
self-serving ways thus harming the corporation.117 However, this risk has
generally “attracted little attention for two [main] reasons.”118 First,
minority shareholders historically “played a largely passive role” in public
corporations.119 Second, the common belief is that the shareholder’s
“primary goal is to improve the [corporation’s] overall economic
performance.”120 After all, this is usually the way the shareholder profits
from owning a company’s shares: by a rise in its stock price and dividend
payouts that will manifest themselves into dividend and capital gains for

112. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1971); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219
F.2d 173, 177 (2d Cir. 1955); In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., No. 7144-VCG, 2012 WL 729232,
at *15 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012).
113. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987); Blasius
Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 658 (Del. Ch. 1988); Guth, 5 A.2d at 510; see also SPAMANN &
SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1, at 61–82.
114. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1373 (Del. 1993).
115. Id. at 1371.
116. Id.
117. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn A. Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1255, 1257 (2008).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1258.
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that shareholder. As discussed in this Article, these assumptions no longer
hold true in certain scenarios.121
B. Overview of Short-Selling
A traditional short sale occurs when an investor sells stock that the
investor does not yet own or when a sale is consummated by delivering
stock borrowed by, or for the account of, the investor.122 The investor later
closes out the short position by returning the borrowed security to the stock
lender, usually by purchasing securities on the open market.123 Investors
selling short-stock believe the stock’s price will fall, hoping to purchase
the stock at a lower price, return the stock to the lender, and make a profit
on the difference between the price of stock sale and the price of stock
repurchase and return.124 If the price of the stock instead increases, the
short seller seeking to terminate their position would purchase the stock at
the higher price and will incur a loss. 125 This loss occurs because the price
of selling the borrowed stock was lower than the price paid upon
repurchase and return of the borrowed shares. Therefore, the short seller
profits when the share price decreases between the investor’s sale and
subsequent repurchase, thus generating a potential incentive for security
price manipulation to the downside.126
There are other ways to short securities that do not require borrowing
and selling shares.127 Investors could sell call options by writing the option
themselves and conveying the option to a willing buyer.128 A call option
entitles the buyer to purchase the stock at the previously agreed strike price
from the writer of the option.129 The option locks in the price, so no matter
how high or low the price of the underlying security goes, the individual
holding the option can buy that stock at the strike price.130 The writer of
the call option, on the other hand, must convey the stock at the strike price
even if the actual price of the security is higher.131 Hence, the individual
121. Id.
122. Short Sales, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsale.htm
[https://perma.cc/35FK-HZXV].
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. ID Analysts, Short Call Options Strategy Explained (Simple Guide), INVESTING DAILY
(Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.investingdaily.com/44389/short-call-options-stragegy/ [https://perma.
cc/T77S-ZSXB]; Jon Lewis, Put Options: The Best Way to Short Stocks, INV. PLACE (June 26, 2009),
https://investorplace.com/2009/06/use-put-options-to-short-stocks/ [https://perma.cc/XQ7J-JLHV].
128. See ID Analysts, supra note 127.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
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writing the call option has a short position, because they are counting on
the stock price to fall or remain below the strike price, and the buyer of the
call option has a long position, because they have the right (but not the
obligation) to purchase the underlying security.132 Needless to say,
options are only valuable so long as the stock price is actually above the
strike price of the option.133 Otherwise, the option holder can simply
purchase the stock for less on the open market and allow the option
contract to expire.134
Similar to shorting stocks through a derivative call option, the
investor can also achieve the same or similar result through put options. 135
While a call option entitles the buyer to buy at a price that the parties
previously agreed to, a put option entitles the buyer to sell at a price the
parties previously agreed to.136 These options function in the opposite
direction of a call option.137 While a call option entitles the holder to
purchase shares of stock from the writer at the strike price, the put option
entitles the holder to sell shares of stock to the writer at the strike price.138
Hence, an individual wishing to bet against a stock may purchase several
put options at a particular strike price.139 Then, when the stock suffers a
decline below the stock price, the right to sell that stock above its new low
price suddenly becomes valuable and marketable to holders of that
security.140 The holder of the put option can then sell it to individuals
(basically as an insurance policy against stock declines), and those
individuals can cash in on the put and force the writer to pay the strike
price for shares that are far less expensive on the open market.141 This is
somewhat akin to selling home insurance for a home that has already
caught fire: The seller can command a very high price.142
There are a number of other creative ways investors can short
securities, but the concept is largely the same, and we do not wish to
exhaust the reader by listing every one. What is important to note is that
shorting a stock is not always lucrative for the short-sellers because
obvious risks exist.143 The potential for severe losses if a stock’s price goes
up after the short sale creates an additional incentive for the short seller to
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See Lewis, supra note 127.
136. Id.; ID Analysts, supra note 127.
137. See Lewis, supra note 127; ID Analysts, supra note 127.
138. Lewis, supra note 127.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. ID Analysts, supra note 127; see Lewis, supra note 127.
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manipulate stock prices downward because a short sale might expose them
to potentially infinite liability if the price of the shorted security continues
to rise in value before the trader can close their position.144 Brokerage
firms generally lend stock to individuals engaging in short sales, using
either the firm’s own inventory, the margin account of another firm’s
customer, or another lender.145 Many brokerages will automatically close
a short position after the investor has lost a sufficient amount of money for
betting on a stock’s price to fall when the price actually rises (especially if
the trader cannot honor a margin call).146 However, investors can still find
themselves deeply in debt after an unsuccessful round of short selling.147
Short selling is not without controversy.148 The biggest concern with
short selling is its potential for market abuse.149 In 2008, for example, over
the course of just one hour, the shares of HBOS plc, a banking and
insurance company in the United Kingdom, dramatically declined when
rumors abounded that the bank had significant financial problems.150 The
rumors proved to be false, and the share price recovered later that day, but
investors with short positions in HBOS shares made a significant profit.151
There is widespread speculation that a hedge fund planted the rumors to
make a quick buck.152 Shareholder proposals also have the potential to
inspire price declines because markets may negatively view a corporation
having to address a pesky proposal.153 Hence, shareholders that hold short
positions in various firms but own sufficient securities to file shareholder
proposals stand well-poised to profit from filing proposals calculated to
reduce firm value.

144. Adam Hayes, Short Selling, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 13, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com
/terms/s/shortselling.asp [https://perma.cc/47CC-GRYH].
145. Adam Hayes, Who Benefits from Lending Shares in a Short Sale?, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 29,
2021), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/05/shortsalebenefit.asp [https://perma.cc/F4XL4H2T].
146. See, e.g., Why Did My Broker Close My Position Without My Consent?, ALPARI,
https://alpari.com/en/faq/trading_terms/position_closed_by_broker/ [https://perma.cc/A6LM-JMNF].
147. See, e.g., Sarah Marsh, German Billionaire Commits Suicide After VW Losses, REUTERS
(Jan. 6, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-merckle-newsmaker-sb-idUSTRE5055O8200
90106 [https://perma.cc/8BJA-X4HS].
148. David Prosser, The Big Question: What Is Short Selling, and Is It a Practice that Should Be
Stamped Out?, INDEP. (Oct. 22, 2011), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-andfeatures/the-big-question-what-is-short-selling-and-is-it-a-practice-that-should-be-stamped-out874717.html [https://perma.cc/HZ5D-HLWY].
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5, at 2. See generally Matsusaka,
Opportunistic Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Shareholder Approval, supra note 5.
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C. The SEC and Shareholder Proposals
The SEC, while created via laws passed by the legislative branch,
operates as an independent regulatory agency of the United States
government.154 The SEC investigates administrative, civil, and criminal
misconduct involving market manipulation and works closely with the
United States Attorneys to prosecute offenders.155 The SEC also has
its own sets of rules and guidelines.156 Some of these guidelines can be
found within the Code of Federal Regulations.157 Others can be found
within the internal rules of the SEC.158 The Commission itself enforces the
rules and guidelines that it sets forth, sometimes serving as an interested
party and in other instances essentially arbitrating disputes between
conflicting parties.159
The SEC plays an important role in the relationship between
shareholders and corporations.160 Part of the SEC’s task is to reduce
154. Mary Jo White, Chairperson, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, 14th Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr.
Corporate Securities and Financial Law Lecture at Fordham Law School: The Importance of
Independence (Oct. 3, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch100113mjw [https://perma.cc/
GA45-N85L].
155. How Investigations Work, U.S SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.sec.gov
/enforce/how-investigations-work.html [https://perma.cc/MFG5-N8VG]; What We Do, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/about/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/ZMG27S7V].
156. Rules and Regulations for the Securities and Exchange Commission and Major Securities
Laws, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/secrulesregs.htm
[https://perma.cc/3C8W-QUQZ].
157. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 240, 250, 260, 270, 275, 300 (2019).
158. Researching the Federal Securities Laws Through the SEC Website, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubssecuritieslaws
htm.html [https://perma.cc/3C8W-QUQZ].
159. See generally ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (2017),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJ8A-5TBP].
160. See Roel C. Campos, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Commissioner:
Remarks Before the CNMV Corporate Governance and Securities Markets Conference (Feb. 8, 2007),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch020807rcc.htm [https://perma.cc/A57H-Y2BF]; Press
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes Amendments to Modernize Shareholder Proposal
Rule (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-232 [https://perma.cc/6SP7M557] [hereinafter SEC Proposes Amendments]; 2015 No-Action Letters Issued Under Exchange Act
Rule 14a-8, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (2016), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cfnoaction/2015_14a-8.shtml [https://perma.cc/6MR9-QT3X] [hereinafter 2015 No-Action Letters];
2016 No-Action Letters Issued Under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (2016),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2016_14a-8.shtml [hereinafter 2016 No-Action
Letters]; 2017 No-Action Letters Issued Under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
(2017), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2017_14a-8.shtml [hereinafter 2017 NoAction Letters]; 2018 No-Action Letters Issued Under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (2018), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2018_14a-8.shtml [hereinafter
2018 No-Action Letters]; 2019 No-Action Letters Issued Under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, U.S. SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N (2019), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2019_14a-8.shtml
[hereinafter 2019 No-Action Letters]; 2019–2020 No-Action Responses Issued Under Exchange Act
Rule 14a-8, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/2019-2020-
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instances of foul play. For example, the agency monitors and curtails
insider trading by collaborating with other investigative agencies such as
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.161 The SEC also helps ensure that
investor voices reach the ears of corporate leadership.162 As holders of the
corporation’s shares, stockholders should have at least some voice in the
corporation’s operation if they so desire.163 To that extent, the SEC
ordinarily requires that shareholder proposals receive company attention
if the proposals comply with certain rules.164 Specifically, a proposal that
complies with the rules must be included on the ballot for vote by other
shareholders at the next shareholder meeting.165 Failure to include a
compliant proposal from an investor not only subjects the corporation to a
potential lawsuit from the rebuffed investor but also subjects the
corporation to enforcement actions and penalties brought by the SEC.166
The rules governing shareholder proposals originated in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.167 This Act gave the SEC the authority
to craft rules and requirements for the submission of shareholder
proposals.168 The SEC did so in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8: Shareholder
proposals (commonly known as Rule 14a-8).169 This rule, fashioned in a
question-and-answer format, explains to the company and its shareholders
the rules regarding the submission of various proposals that both sides
must follow.170 Corporate attorneys frequently employ these rules to
attempt to exclude shareholder proposals from consideration by pointing
out to the SEC that the shareholder did not comply with one or more of the
rules that the agency has promulgated for submission of such proposals.171
As a result, the corporation will request that the SEC issue a “no-action
letter,” which is a letter that confirms the SEC plans to take no action
shareholder-proposals-no-action [https://perma.cc/9G95-KURT] [hereinafter 2019-2020 No-Action
Responses].
161. Insider Trading — Proactive Enforcement Paying Off, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
(Aug. 13, 2012), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/insider-trading [https://perma.cc/4JCW-FHNC].
162. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020); SEC Proposes Amendments, supra note 160; 2016 No-Action
Letters, supra note 160; 2017 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2018 No-Action Letters, supra note
160; 2019 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2019–2020 No-Action Responses, supra note 160.
163. Bebchuk, supra note 5.
164. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020); SEC Proposes Amendments, supra note 160; 2016 No-Action
Letters, supra note 160; 2017 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2018 No-Action Letters, supra note
160; 2019 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2019–2020 No-Action Responses, supra note 160.
165. Id.
166. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
167. 17 C.F.R. § 240 (2020).
168. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., 2016 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2017 No-Action Letters, supra note 160;
2018 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2019 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2019–2020 NoAction Responses, supra note 160.

730

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 44:707

against the company for excluding a particular proposal from the annual
meeting materials and from a shareholder vote.172
These letters are not technically binding on the SEC, and the
shareholder can still pursue their own personal court action to require the
proposal to receive a vote.173 However, when the SEC issues a no-action
letter, it is typically the end of the discussion.174 Thousands of requests for
no-action letters have been submitted to the SEC over the past two
decades, and the SEC has usually sided with the corporations on whether
a no-action letter would issue.175 However, a non-trivial number of cases
have involved corporations losing their bid to exclude the proposal,
leaving them the choice to either negotiate with the proponent to reach
some settlement or to put the matter to a vote at the annual meeting.176
Refusing to choose one of these options would open the corporation to
an enforcement action not only by the shareholder but by the SEC as
well—a path likely far more destructive than its alternative, and one that
would still ultimately lead to the proposal receiving a vote at the annual
shareholders’ meeting.
As mentioned above, almost anyone who is truly interested in
making a shareholder proposal to any company can do so: all the
proponent would have to do is purchase at least $2,000 worth of company
shares or 1% or more of company shares, hold the stock for at least three
years,177 and then state their subjective intent at the time of the proposal to
continue holding the security.178 That is, the investor could, theoretically,
change their mind and sell the stock later regardless of their earlier implicit
claim that they intended to hold the security indefinitely.179 The possibility
of almost anyone submitting a proposal leaves publicly-traded companies
172. No Action Letters, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fastanswers/answersnoactionhtm.html; SEC Proposes Amendments, supra note 160; 2019–2020 NoAction Responses, supra note 160.
173. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. SEC, 45 F.3d 7, 12–13 (2d Cir. 1995).
174. See id. at 13.
175. 2016 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2017 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2018 NoAction Letters, supra note 160; 2019 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2019–2020 No-Action
Responses, supra note 160.
176. Hannah Orowitz & Brigid Rosati Georgeson, An Early Look at the 2020 Proxy Season,
HARV.
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(June
10,
2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/10/an-early-look-at-the-2020-proxy-season/
[https://perma.cc/FJ2A-VPPS]; see also SEC Proposes Amendments, supra note 160; 2019–2020 NoAction Responses, supra note 160.
177. The three-year requirement was recently raised from one year. See Clayton, supra note 7;
Lee, supra note 7; Roisman, supra note 7; Leaf & Bartlett, supra note 7. The proponent can still hold
for just over one year if the individual holds $25,000 of company stock. This is pocket change for
many Wall Street traders.
178. Shareholder Proposals, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 16, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/
interps/legal/cfslb14g.htm [https://perma.cc/QA9V-Y8Q8]; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
179. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
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open to proposals from individuals who are just “passing through” without
any significant stake in the company.180 Hence, the economic disincentives
ordinarily present to dissuade poor behavior by shareholders are not
necessarily effective in these cases.
Currently, the SEC only receives a few hundred requests per year to
permit exclusion of proposals.181 However, there are significantly more
stockholders that could qualify as individuals with the right to make such
proposals. If these shareholders began to submit proposal after proposal,
it is entirely possible that both the SEC staff handling these no-action letter
requests and the companies receiving them would become
overwhelmed.182 Naturally, it may not be optimal for the shareholder to
engage in such behavior, as they would effectively be participating in
devaluing their own company.183 However, the window appears open for
activists or nefarious actors to infiltrate the rank of company ownership
and slow its legal operations.184 The fact that this has not taken place yet
(at least not to a detectable degree) is quite surprising, especially because
the current short-selling market allows investors to potentially profiteer off
of a company’s woes.
So far, without the unregulated influx of proposals from
troublemakers, the SEC ordinarily receives and processes most no-action
letters during the first part of the year.185 Generally, the process of
submitting a proposal and battling with the corporation to ensure that the
proposal appears on the ballot unfolds as follows:
1. A shareholder conceives of a particular action that they wish the
company to take or refrain from taking. These actions can
include anything from reducing pollution and adopting corporate
social responsibility policies to amending shareholder voting
procedures.186
180. Id.
181. SEC Proposes Amendments, supra note 160; 2016 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2017
No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2018 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2019 No-Action Letters,
supra note 160; 2019–2020 No-Action, supra note 160.
182. See, e.g., US Government Shutdown Ends — SEC Issues Guidance to Address Significant
Backlog of Filing Reviews and Shareholder Proposals, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM
LLP (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2019/01/us-governmentshutdown-ends [https://perma.cc/P8ZN-KS5L].
183. See Chris R. Murphy, Why Do Companies Care About Their Stock Price?, INVESTOPEDIA
(Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/investing/why-do-companies-care-about-their-stockprices/ [https://perma.cc/TT4A-KCDZ].
184. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
185. See, e.g., Division of Investment Management Staff No-Action and Interpretive Letters, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/investment/investment-management-no-action-letters
[https://perma.cc/23XG-75ML].
186. COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS., EVERYTHING YOU EVER WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT
FILING A SHAREOWNER PROPOSAL BUT WERE AFRAID TO ASK 8–9 (2011).
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2. The shareholder drafts a proposal to that effect and submits it to
the company prior to the annual meeting in hopes of having the
proposal included for a vote by other shareholders.187
3. The corporation decides its course of action. Because there is
little evidence that corporate leadership views these proposals as
helpful, as indicated by hundreds of no-action letter requests, the
corporation seeks to essentially suppress the matter from coming
to a vote by seeking a no-action letter from the SEC.188 In so
doing, the company provides the SEC with the proposal it
received and then cites reasons under Rule 14a-8 why the
proposal violates SEC rules and should be excluded.189
4. Sometimes, the shareholder responds (typically represented by a
lawyer), arguing why the proposal does not violate guidelines
and that it cannot be properly excluded.190
5. The parties negotiate. While the filings arrive at the SEC, there
is frequently quite a bit of action on the sidelines: the company
and the shareholder engage in negotiations where the company
sometimes offers concessions in exchange for the shareholder
withdrawing their offer.191 It is even possible for company
leadership to take some (but rarely all) steps to implement the
shareholder proposal without requiring a vote at the annual
meeting.192
6. If the parties reach an agreement, they typically file a document
with the SEC notifying agency attorneys that the SEC need not
reach a conclusion regarding the no-action request.193 Instead,
the attorneys are informed that the shareholder is withdrawing
their proposal and the “case” should be closed.194
7. In the alternative, when no agreement can be reached, the SEC
decides whether or not the proposal complies with SEC rules.195
If so, then the SEC declines to issue the no-action letter the
company seeks. If not, then the SEC will issue such a letter:196
(a) If the SEC refuses to issue a no-action letter, the company
187. Id. at 7.
188. Id. at 12.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 4.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 12.
196. Id.
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must either include the shareholder proposal on the annual ballot
(and thus risk it passing by a popular vote) or face lawsuits from
both the SEC and the shareholder that carry significant
penalties;197 (b) If the SEC issues a no-action letter, the company
may still include the proposal on its ballot if its leadership so
desires, or it may omit the proposal.198 If the leadership omits the
proposal, the shareholder may sue to have the proposal included
on the ballot during a future annual meeting.199 Some
negotiations may also occur at this stage, perhaps to settle or
prevent such a lawsuit, but evidence of this is less available.200
Given this large number of steps (and filings that can span hundreds
of pages), shareholder proposals can cause publicly-traded companies a
non-trivial amount of hassle.201 This hassle would be especially
pronounced for smaller companies with low market capitalization that
must rely on general counsel or hire expensive outside counsel to deal with
suboptimal proposals.202 A larger portion of a small company’s revenues
may have to be devoted to lawyer fees to oppose the proposal. 203
Moreover, if we assume that company leadership has at least some
incentive to lead the company to prosperity, then we can infer that
opposition to shareholder proposals denotes executives’ beliefs that the
proposal would harm the company if passed.204 Furthermore, the existence
of a potential proposal that can drastically alter the way a company does
business results in a heightened possibility of significant and extreme
change.205 This change increases uncertainty around the company, has the
potential to interfere with the contracts available to the company, may
interfere with the ability to raise capital, and generally reduces the price
that market traders are willing to pay for shares in the company (thus
harming the net worth of the remaining shareholders that had nothing to
do with the proposal whatsoever).206

197. Id. at 13.
198. See id. at 12.
199. Id.
200. See id.
201. Responsible Shareholder Engagement & Long-Term Value Creation, BUS. ROUNDTABLE,
https://www.businessroundtable.org/archive/resources/responsible-shareholder-engagement-longterm-value-creation [https://perma.cc/G5V7-9D35].
202. See id.
203. See generally James McRitchie, The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder Democracy, CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.corpgov.net/2019/12/the-costs-and-benefits-of-share
holder-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/J8YN-27HZ].
204. Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5, at 1.
205. See id. at 1–2.
206. Id. at 29.
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Currently, there are many SEC regulations that could exclude a
proposal. For example, this could happen if the proposal’s length exceeds
500 words, if the proposal is a second or subsequent submission for vote
at the same shareholder meeting, or if the proposal fails to comply with
the other requirements under Rule 14a-8. However, nothing in the
regulations requires the individual submitting the proposal to be acting in
good faith (or otherwise demonstrating loyalty or care) toward the
corporation.207 Thus, it is apparently legal to submit a proposal with full
knowledge that the proposal would harm the market price of company
stock.208 Because shareholder proposals lack a good faith requirement, the
executive team, members of the board, and other shareholders have little
recourse against a troublemaking proponent.209 The SEC has recently
adopted several amendments to Rule 14a-8, which purport to make the
exploitation of the shareholder proposal more difficult.210 Nevertheless,
none of these amendments would seriously hamper stock price
manipulation through the filing of proposals intended to harm a publicly
traded company.
In November of 2019, momentum for changing shareholder proposal
rules escalated when the SEC proposed amendments to modernize Rule
14a-8.211 The proposed amendments would: (i) increase the ownership
requirements that a shareholder must satisfy to be eligible for filing a
proposal;212 (ii) update the current “one proposal” rule to clarify that a
single person cannot submit more than one shareholder proposal at the
same shareholders’ meeting, regardless of whether the person submits a
proposal as a shareholder or as a shareholder representative; and (iii)
modernize the levels of shareholder support a proposal must receive to be
eligible for resubmission of the proposal at the company’s future
shareholder meetings.213 Although discussion of these rules, and their
207. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
208. Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5, at 29–30.
209. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
210. Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5, at 7; Matsusaka, Opportunistic
Proposals, supra note 5, at 3221 n.4. See generally Matsusaka, Shareholder Approval, supra note 5;
Leaf & Bartlett, supra note 7.
211. See SEC Proposes Amendments, supra note 160.
212. Specifically, the proposed amendment would update the current requirement that a
shareholder hold at least $2,000 or 1% of a company’s securities for at least three years to be eligible
to submit a proposal. In addition to eliminating the 1% threshold, the proposal would amend the rule
with the following three alternative thresholds: “continuous ownership of at least $2,000 of the
company’s securities for at least three years; continuous ownership of at least $15,000 of the
company’s securities for at least two years; or continuous ownership of at least $25,000 of the
company’s securities for at least one year.” SEC Proposes Amendments, supra note 160.
213. The proposed amendments would modernize the current resubmission thresholds of 3%,
6%, and 10% for matters voted on once, twice, or three or more times in the last five years,
respectively, with thresholds of 5%, 15%, and 25%, respectively, and would add a new provision that
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adoption in September of 2020, is a step in the right direction,214 it does
little to quell the possibility of the actions described below.
D. Room for Exploitation
The rules noted above leave ample room for abuse.215 As suggested
in this Article’s introduction, it is entirely possible for individuals to take
a small $2,000 position in a company, wait the appropriate amount of time
to qualify for making a shareholder proposal, take a $1,000,000 short
position in the company through another brokerage, and then send
proposals that would harm the business. It may not be advisable for
investors hoping to grow their portfolio from market gains to hold the
same long and short positions, but it might be ideal for someone seeking
to manipulate the market.216 It is true that the individual must certify
ownership of at least $2,000 in company stock to be eligible for making
shareholder proposals, but the requirement is not a net requirement: the
shareholder need only disclose their ownership of $2,000 at the brokerage
where the shareholder holds the long position.217 There is no requirement
to disclose the short positions.218
Moreover, it may not even be necessary to open two separate
brokerage accounts.219 It is quite possible to construct a long and short
position in the same company within the same brokerage and still avoid
reducing one’s share of company stock below $2,000.220 The availability
of options trading makes this possible. 221 All an investor must do is sell
would permit exclusion of a proposal that has been previously voted on three or more times in the past
five years if the proposal “(i) received less than 50% of the votes cast and (ii) experienced a decline in
shareholder support of 10[%] . . . or more compared to the immediately preceding vote.” SEC
Proposes Amendments, supra note 160.
214. See generally Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Opportunistic
Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Shareholder Approval, supra note 5; Leaf & Bartlett, supra note
7.
215. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
216. Raymond Stein, Advanced Trading: Going Long and Short on the Same Instrument in the
Same Account, TRADERS EXCLUSIVE, https://tradersexclusive.com/ad_trad_go_long_and_short/
[https://perma.cc/22DS-F677].
217. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
218. See id.
219. Stein, supra note 216. A brokerage account is a financial account that can be opened with
an investment firm that provides access to stocks, bonds, and mutual funds. Many brokers permit
brokerage accounts to be opened quickly online, and many brokerage firms permit brokerage accounts
to be opened with no initial deposit. Arielle O’Shea, What Is a Brokerage Account and How Do I Open
One?, NERD WALLET (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/investing/what-is-how-toopen-brokerage-account [https://perma.cc/HA3X-R3WV].
220. Stein, supra note 216.
221. Leslie Kramer, Long Position vs. Short Position: What’s the Difference?, INVESTOPEDIA
(Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/100314/whats-difference-between-longand-short-position-market.asp [https://perma.cc/ZKY6-Q4PR].
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call options on the stock.222 If the investor does not own any call
options on the stock, they can simply write the call options and sell them,
binding themselves to the contract these options imply; at the choice of the
buyer, the writer of the call option shall provide to the buyer 100 shares
of stock at the agreed strike price,223 if the buyer exercises the option prior
to expiration.224
Furthermore, there is nothing requiring that these call options be
covered by existing shares, even if the seller of the option is selling options
they wrote and did not buy from another trader.225 That is, an individual
could hold only 100 shares of a $20-per-share company and yet sell call
options on 1,000 or 1,000,000 shares they do not own (depending on the
limitations of the brokerage and the available leverage in the investor’s
account).226 If the shareholder can then manipulate the stock price to fall
after selling these options, the options lose value, and the shareholder can
cover their position and walk away with the profit.227 In the alternative, if
the shareholder has great faith in their ability to manipulate the price of the
stock, the individual can simply wait until the option expires out of the
money, walking away with the entirety of the proceeds from selling the
option without spending the money to cover228 the position.
This trade is not without risks, of course. Because writing a naked
call option,229 as described, above requires the writer to furnish shares of
stock they do not own, writing such an option exposes the trader to
222. Stein, supra note 216. Call options are financial contracts providing the buyer with the right,
but not the obligation, to buy a stock, bond, commodity, or other asset or instrument at a specific price
within a specified time period. A call buyer profits when the price of the underlying asset profits. Jason
Fernando,
Call
Option
Definition,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Feb.
2,
2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/calloption.asp [https://perma.cc/WKD3-32AJ].
223. “Strike price” is the price at which a put or call option can be exercised. Jason Fernando,
Strike Price, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 7, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/strikeprice.asp
[https://perma.cc/2GUW-5CU3].
224. Jeff Bishop, Everything You Need to Know to Sell a Call Option, RAGING BULL (Nov. 4,
2019), https://ragingbull.com/options/sell-call-option/ [https://perma.cc/7FA9-YY99].
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Scott Connor, Options Trading Guide: What Are Put & Call Options, AMERITRADE (July
21, 2020), https://tickertape.tdameritrade.com/trading/options-basics-what-are-puts-and-calls-16682
[https://perma.cc/NK7Q-BSDZ]. A trader could achieve this simply by purchasing call options from
yet another trader and holding them until expiration to offset the effects of the options originally
written by the trader.
228. Covering a position means the investor purchases options from yet another option writer
and uses them to offset the options the investor has written earlier. James Chen, Short Covering,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Jan.
28,
2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shortcovering.asp
[https://perma.cc/2KGD-NE54].
229. A “naked option” is an option sold without “any previously set-aside shares or cash to fulfill
the option obligation at expiration.” Gordon Scott, Naked Option, INVESTOPEDIA (May 2, 2019),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nakedoption.asp [https://perma.cc/YUX7-6MXT]. Naked call
options that are exercised “create a short position in the seller’s account.” Id.

2021]

Alarming Legality of Security Manipulation

737

potentially infinite liability (because the price of the stock can theoretically
grow infinitely above the option strike-price in the time remaining prior to
the option’s expiration).230 However, a trader who has the ability to
manipulate the stock price of the security they short may have a reduced
risk of this happening, thereby gaining an unfair trading advantage.231
Shorting the security can be accomplished through purchasing
options as well as selling them.232 Put options, which give the holder the
right (but not the obligation) to purchase a security at the strike price,
prove crucial in this arrangement.233 A clever trader who can anticipate a
stock drop would purchase put options that would cover the stock they
own or perhaps stock they do not own.234 In this way, the shareholder can
ensure that they can sell the stock at a price above that which the
shareholder anticipates in the future.235 This strategy is valuable for the
sale of the securities the shareholder may have used to file a damaging
shareholder proposal in the first place.236 Any option contracts covering
shares that the shareholder does not own can be sold for a profit to other
shareholders in need of them.237 If no other traders need them (although
there are almost always those who do), the investor can simply purchase
additional shares of the stock below the strike price of the put option and
sell them at the strike price using their remaining put option contracts. 238
Then, the shareholder collects the difference between the purchase price
of the shares and the strike price of the put option as profit.239
The recent SEC rules can taper down potential stock manipulation
activity but not by much. Recall that $2,000 now entitles the holder to a
proposal once they have held the securities for three years rather than just
one.240 However, marginally greater positions in the same security permit
230. Jared Woodard, Why Covered Calls Are Riskier than You Think, THE ST. (Nov. 15, 2011),
https://www.thestreet.com/investing/options/why-covered-calls-are-riskier-than-you-think-11311917
[https://perma.cc/S4G8-R4BZ].
231. Ken Little, How to Legally Manipulate Stock Prices, THE BALANCE (Aug. 5, 2019),
https://www.thebalance.com/how-to-legally-manipulate-stock-prices-3140856
[https://perma.cc/YC6Q-GPX4].
232. How to Short a Stock with Options, FINANCHILL, https://financhill.com/blog/investing/howto-short-a-stock-with-options [https://perma.cc/D4LJ-YU8N].
233. Scott Connor, The Short Option: A Primer on Selling Put and Call Options, AMERITRADE
(July 13, 2018), https://tickertape.tdameritrade.com/trading/short-options-primer-16744 [https://
perma.cc/DG3M-WAN8].
234. Protective Put (Long Stock + Long Put), FIDELITY (2013), https://www.fidelity.com/
learning-center/investment-products/options/options-strategy-guide/protective-put [https://perma.cc/
EH6N-VCX7].
235. Id.
236. See id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Leaf & Bartlett, supra note 7.
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the shareholder to exercise their right to file proposals just as before.241 For
example, holding $25,000 in the security permits the submission of a
shareholder proposal after just one year of ownership.242 A middle ground
exists at $15,000, where two years of ownership constitute the litmus test
for having a sufficient stake in the company.243 These new requirements
will hardly decrease the possibility of stock manipulation by the big
players: hedge funds, investment funds, mutual funds, foundations, trust
funds, and other large investment vehicles often hold well over $25,000 in
a wide variety of securities (if not all securities available on the American
exchanges). Meeting the threshold necessary might only pose problems
for the retail investors, and if a retail investor has less than $25,000 to
invest, it is entirely possible they are in no position to profitably short the
security anyway. In summary, the SEC rule change might reduce the
problem of pesky shareholder proposals from retail investors with little
stake in the company, but it does nothing to thwart or eliminate the
potential for stock price manipulation by those actually equipped to do it.
Some may argue that obvious stock manipulation by deliberately
poor proposals may breach a fiduciary duty to other investors to not
deliberately devalue the company.244 The law regarding this potential is
highly amorphous and perhaps still waiting to form: We are aware of no
fiduciary duty currently extended to minority shareholders in a
non-merger context. While a case might be made for negligence, breach
of fiduciary duty, or other tort, the slow process245 of the courts—which
take years if not decades to decide such matters—fails to compare to the
fast profit made from a well-timed trade (which can occur in less than one
second). Moreover, there are strong indications that most jurisdictions
would not impose such a duty on investors to begin with, meaning that
devaluing one’s own company may seem unwise, but it is not illegal.246

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See generally Protective Put (Long Stock + Long Put), supra note 234.
245. See Patrick Kitchin, The Slow Pace of Litigation Process, KITCHIN LEGAL,
https://www.kitchinlegal.com/the-slow-pace-of-litigation-process [https://perma.cc/RCM8-MLH5].
246. As discussed above, majority or controlling shareholders of a corporation may owe
fiduciary duties in certain scenarios, but such fiduciary duties are only owed if the shareholder assumes
“control” of the corporation (and even if the shareholder has “control” of the corporation, the
shareholder may still owe no fiduciary duties at all). Fiduciary Duties: An Important Consideration in
Owning and Running a Business, CARLILE PATCHEN & MURPHY LLP (Nov. 25, 2019),
https://www.cpmlaw.com/fiduciary-duties/ [https://perma.cc/8MMS-RFS2]. Minority shareholders
do not owe any fiduciary duties to the corporation or the other shareholders. See Anabtawi & Stout,
supra note 117, at 1257.
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In other areas of law, such as criminal enforcement of security laws,
corporations will find little respite from shareholders with ill intent.247 The
SEC does frequently enforce laws against insider trading, market
manipulation through false information, and similar offenses.248 However,
shareholders crippling their own companies, while seemingly nefarious,
does not currently fit into the SEC’s enforcement scheme mainly focused
on insider trading and fraud regulation; bad shareholder proposals are not
illegal. After all, nothing about submitting a shareholder proposal involves
fraud: the proponent is not stating a falsehood about anything, but rather
merely states the shareholder’s preference for how the corporation should
be run.249 There is no requirement that the proponent certify their good
faith or that they hold no short interests in the company.250
In fact, since there is no law, rule, or regulation that would prevent a
shareholder from honestly desiring their company’s demise (due to
holding short interests or otherwise), the shareholder may make a proposal
with the open intent of harming their company without recourse. Hence,
there is little opportunity to commit fraud in the first place (except perhaps
via misrepresentation and forgery regarding the number of shares the
shareholder holds and how long they have held them). 251 The shareholder
could conceivably misrepresent their intent to hold the shares indefinitely
into the future.252 However, not only would this lack of intent be
notoriously hard to prove, but a poor proposal need not be accompanied
by a future intent to sell the $2,000 interest.253 The shareholder can actually
maintain its stake in the company (while closing the short positions for a
247. See generally Michael D. Ricciuti, Walter P. Loughlin, Jeffrey L. Bornstein, Brian W.
Stolarz & Leanne E. Hartmann, Criminal Enforcement of the Securities Laws, in THE SECURITIES
ENFORCEMENT MANUAL (Michael J. Missal & Richard M. Phillips eds., 2d ed. 2007),
https://files.klgates.com/files/upload/se_manual_chapter_8.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2YS-E33A].
248. See generally TOM SWIERS, OFFICE OF INT’L AFFS., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, MARKET
MANIPULATION, https://www.sec.gov/files/Market%20Manipulations%20and%20Case%20
Studies.pdf [https://perma.cc/FPN6-H79P]; SEC Enforcement Actions – Insider Trading Cases, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 15, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml
[https://perma.cc/GEJ2-QQA4].
249. See generally Jeffrey Karpf, Sandra Flow & Mandeep Kalra, Board Composition and
Shareholder Proposals, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/01/28/board-composition-and-shareholder-proposals/
[https://perma.cc/7MGJ-TGYP].
250. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
251. Id. This type of misrepresentation, even if made, rarely suffers from any type of prosecution
and is regularly treated as a mistake. The company receiving the shareholder proposal merely sends a
no-action letter request to the SEC pointing out the deficiency in proof of long-term ownership, and
the SEC promptly issues a no-action letter. This ordinarily ends the matter fairly quickly, and we are
aware of no repercussions to the shareholder except the exclusion of the proposal from the ballot at
the next shareholders’ meeting.
252. Cf. Id.
253. Cf. Id.
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profit) in hopes of submitting future damaging proposals and profiteering
even more in subsequent years by taking more and more short positions as
the years pass.
Moreover, the submission of an intentionally foul shareholder
proposal likely cannot lead to penalties for insider trading.254 While the
trader might know their own submission will soon become public and
reduce the company’s stock price, this is not the type of non-public
information that would prohibit trading the security. 255 After all, to
constitute insider trading, the individual must know of some non-public
detail about company operations, not the upcoming publication of a
shareholder proposal from outside the company by one of its
shareholders.256 Submitting a proposal cannot be considered manipulation
of markets by knowingly inducing others to trade on information that was
not true.257 There is no truth asserted in a proposal: It is merely a
suggestion, however misguided, about how the company should conduct
its business.258 From a certain perspective, some might argue it should be
legal for owners to destroy their property if they want to destroy it. 259
However, in instances where the ownership is shared and where suspect
motives may exist for causing the destruction, potential abuses may
become commonplace.
II. THE DOCUMENTED IMPACT OF SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS ON
CORPORATIONS
Financial and economic literature suggests a complicated
relationship between corporate leadership, shareholders, shareholder
proposals, and company prospects.260 Theoretical models incorporate the
possibility that the right to make proposals may hurt shareholders by
shifting the position of leadership toward the goals of the activists.261 This
can happen if the shareholder proposal passes or if the leadership, which
254. Insider Trading, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fastanswers/answersinsiderhtm.html [https://perma.cc/9WY7-FNWV].
255. See generally Harry S. Davis, Overview of the Law of Insider Trading, in SCHULTE ROTH
& ZABEL LLP, INSIDER TRADING LAW AND COMPLIANCE ANSWER BOOK (Harry S. Davis ed., 2018).
256. What
Is
Material
Nonpublic
Information?,
CORP.
FIN.
INST.,
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/finance/material-non-public-information/
[https://perma.cc/MQX6-ZJ5X].
257. See generally id.
258. Shareholder
Proposal
Law
and
Legal
Definition,
US
LEGAL,
https://definitions.uslegal.com/s/shareholder-proposal/ [https://perma.cc/W7HU-GUL4].
259. See generally Lior Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005).
260. See generally Bebchuk, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5;
Matsusaka, Opportunistic Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Shareholder Approval, supra note 5;
Cuñat, Gine & Guadalupe, supra note 5; Denes, Karpoff & McWilliams, supra note 5.
261. See generally Matsusaka, Shareholder Approval, supra note 5.
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has incentives to discourage proposals (and votes on them at annual
meetings), negotiates a settlement with the proponent.262 Inevitably, such
a settlement would move the company at least a little in the direction
desired by the proponent.263 Such movements can occur even when they
decrease overall shareholder wealth.264
Empirical studies also provide examples of opportunistic behavior
by shareholders who make various proposals,265 though not yet in the
context of short sellers that game the system. We suspect the latter studies
are not currently available because data on proposers shorting their own
stock is ordinarily private and unavailable for research. Future empirical
analysis of short selling may be forced to rely on self-reporting or
participants opting into a study, which may not be as accurate as other
ways of gathering data.266 However, other shareholders that would benefit
from reducing the profits of the corporation have fearlessly engaged in
attempts to manipulate the way corporations do business.267
Unions often exemplify this relationship. Unions frequently hold
securities in the companies where they represent employees to gain an
advantage in collective bargaining negotiations.268 Because it is ordinarily
the duty of unions to maximize employee wages and benefits, this action
runs contrary to the company’s intent to maximize profit (and therefore to
potentially minimize expenditures such as wages).269 These organizations
have the necessary incentives to impact firm operations negatively by
seeking to increase employee wages, because unions often hold stock in
these corporations well in excess of $2,000 and often hold these securities
well in excess of the required holding period.270 The employees, in turn,
hope that the increase in wages will exceed whatever losses they can
expect to suffer as a result of their shareholder activism.271
Scholars find this precise relationship greatly increases the use of
shareholder proposals by unions as bargaining chips in years when the
262. See generally id.
263. See generally id.
264. See generally id.
265. See generally Matsusaka, Opportunistic Proposals, supra note 5.
266. “[S]hort sellers are generally reluctant to report their positions publicly. Many fund
managers believe that disclosing positions can lead to ‘copycat investing,’ making them reluctant to
give away their informational advantages. Additionally . . . [there is evidence that] firms take legal
and regulatory actions against disclosed short sellers by alleging criminal conduct, suing them, hiring
private investigators, asking public authorities to investigate them, and manipulating securities
markets to impede short selling.” Barbara A. Bliss, Peter Molk & Frank Partnoy, Negative Activism,
97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1333, 1347–48 (2020).
267. See generally Matsusaka, Opportunistic Proposals, supra note 5.
268. See generally id.
269. See generally id.
270. See generally id.
271. See generally id.
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collective bargaining agreement must be renewed.272 These scholars have
discovered that “in contract expiration years compared with nonexpiration years, unions increase their proposal rate by one-fifth,
particularly proposals concerning executive compensation.”273 These
proposals are unlikely to receive support from outside groups, but the
average proposal still results in a negative market reaction.274 Moreover,
the proposals are frequently withdrawn once the union achieves wage
concessions for union workers.275 This suggests that unions file these
proposals to impose a hardship upon the management team and essentially
use such proposals as bargaining chips at the negotiation table.276 Few
would argue that these types of exploitative tactics improve shareholder
returns, and yet they are still legal despite a detrimental impact (or at least
a potential impact) on the stock price.277 A similar outcome can be
achieved far more frequently by shareholders who, instead of limiting
themselves to filing harassing proposals in certain contract years, submit
their proposals annually to dozens of companies while shorting their stock.
This is precisely the type of damaging, counterproductive result that the
SEC should seek to prevent.
As scholars dug deeper into shareholder proposals, they began to
look at all shareholder proposals, not just those filed by unions.278
Surveying proposals from 2007 through 2018, they found that the market
reacted positively when the SEC allowed exclusion.279 This suggests that
the market generally viewed proposals as potentially harming corporations
rather than helping them, which is entirely consistent with investors’ relief
when the SEC permits setting such proposals aside before they even have
the chance of passing by a majority vote.280 Moreover, it is possible that
the stock price would have risen sooner (and perhaps higher) if the
proposal had never been made in the first place.
Of course, this can be true without anyone shorting the company and
filing nefarious proposals; it is entirely possible, and perhaps even likely,
that the executives have greater knowledge about optimal firm
management than those shareholders themselves. Then, the exclusion of
shareholder proposals might be viewed positively by the market even if
the proposals are well-meaning (but generally misguided). The potential
272. See generally id.
273. Matsusaka, Opportunistic Proposals, supra note 5.
274. See generally id.
275. See generally id.
276. See generally id.
277. See generally id.
278. Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5, at 11–12.
279. Id. at 1, 3–4.
280. See generally id.
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negative effect that news of proposals has on stock price might become
even worse if the rules do not exclude individuals filing shareholder
proposals specifically to reduce stock price. The fact that current SEC
rules illegalize a significant amount of potentially harmless activity but do
not illegalize this type of misconduct appears to be an oversight.
Financial research further indicates that particular kinds of
shareholder proposals tend to do the most damage.281 Investor skepticism
seems to be highest regarding proposals concerning corporate governance
and proposals affecting already highly profitable firms.282 The former
might be a reaction to the fact that investors believe corporate governance
at most firms is more optimum than whatever measures shareholders
propose. Shareholder proposals seeking to change the way highly
profitable firms operate may risk “killing the goose that laid the golden
egg.” According to financial scholars, shareholders appear to have fewer
concerns that bad proposals will pass and more fear that considering the
proposals and negotiating with the proponents will distract managers from
their task of maximizing shareholder wealth.283 After all, if management
is properly motivated to avoid wasting company resources and decreasing
firm value, then managers would necessarily need to address these
proposals rather than risking their passage.284
Some academic dispute does exist with respect to whether
shareholder activism is a positive thing in its current form and whether it
should be expanded rather than curtailed.285 For example, Professor
Bebchuk has argued forcefully that shareholders do not have enough
power.286 He presents empirical evidence showing that shareholders,
despite holding shares of the company, ordinarily lack the necessary power
to affect corporate change.287 Professor Bebchuk suggests this should lead
to granting shareholders additional voting powers, such as the right to
initiate and adopt “rules-of-the-game” decisions to alter the company’s
charter or even the state of incorporation.288 Crucial to this argument is
Professor Bebchuk’s point that merely voting for directors that could,
theoretically, initiate these changes on shareholders’ behalf proves
insufficient in practice to actually change the path of the corporation.289

281. See generally id.
282. See generally id.
283. See generally id.
284. See generally id.
285. Bebchuk, supra note 5, at 880.
286. See id. at 870–72.
287. Id. at 844.
288. See generally id.
289. Id. at 856.
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Nevertheless, Professor Bebchuk’s analysis seems silent with respect
to shareholder activism intended to actually hurt the company.290 The
article appears to avoid consideration of what would happen if some
shareholders formulated a nefarious intent.291 Nor can the article rely on
the more recent research on shareholder proposals we cite above, because
Professor Bebchuk published his article almost fifteen years prior to
publication of this research.292 Therefore, it may be possible that some of
the conclusions he reached require reconsideration in light of new findings
that shareholder democracy may decrease the value of the corporation.293
Earlier economic and financial research about the value of
shareholder proposals does exist, which may appear contrary to the more
recent studies.294 For example, proposals that pass by a close margin result
in positive abnormal returns to the tune of 2.8%, with larger returns in
firms with anti-takeover provisions.295 Higher institutional ownership and
stronger investor activism are also associated with an increased return for
the shareholders.296 A recent literature review found that activism
associated with adopting certain characteristics of corporate takeovers,
like significant stockholdings, is associated with positive changes in share
values and firm operating performance.297 Other activism seems to have
little effect on firm value.298 This research may suggest that activism has
actually become more value-increasing for firms over time.299 This result
may be consistent with prior theoretical work suggesting the importance
of shareholder activism in order to keep rogue managers in line.300
Moreover, it may be a sign of businesses and their shareholders copying
effective strategies from others.301

290. See generally id.
291. See generally Bebchuk, supra note 5.
292. See generally id.; Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka,
Opportunistic Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Shareholder Approval, supra note 5.
293. See generally Bebchuk, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5;
Matsusaka, Opportunistic Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Shareholder Approval, supra note 5.
294. See generally Cuñat, Gine & Guadalupe, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals,
supra note 5; Matsusaka, Opportunistic Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Shareholder Approval,
supra note 5.
295. See generally Cuñat, Gine & Guadalupe, supra note 5.
296. See generally id.
297. Denes, Karpoff & McWilliams, supra note 5, at 411.
298. See generally Denes, Karpoff & McWilliams, supra note 5; Cuñat, Gine & Guadalupe,
supra note 5.
299. See generally Denes, Karpoff & McWilliams, supra note 5; Cuñat, Gine & Guadalupe,
supra note 5.
300. See generally Denes, Karpoff & McWilliams, supra note 5; Cuñat, Gine & Guadalupe,
supra note 5.
301. See generally Denes, Karpoff & McWilliams, supra note 5; Cuñat, Gine & Guadalupe,
supra note 5.
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However, the existence of such arguments regarding the benefits of
shareholder proposals does not constitute a strong case against tighter
regulation of those who make proposals.302 For example, studies that
suggest closely-contested shareholder proposals that ultimately pass are
helpful but cannot say very much about the shareholder proposals that
might be filed by individuals seeking to short the stock with no intent to
generate a close vote at the shareholder meetings.303 After all, almost by
definition, intentionally poor proposals would not receive very much
support at the meeting because (presumably) most of the shareholders
wish their company would succeed.304 Therefore, studies that only observe
the effect of closely contested proposals do not negate the need for tighter
controls on ill-motivated parties, because these studies do not observe the
effect of all proposals, only the effect of proposals that pass.305
Similarly, literature reviews that draw conclusions about passed
activist measures are less helpful in evaluating the economic and financial
benefit of all proposals because few proposals pass or even make it to a
vote.306 Therefore, more recent research that focuses specifically on the
proposals themselves should prove more useful in determining whether
nefarious actors can harm a corporation when they file a proposal that does
not and will not receive much support.307 However, we should note that
even if there was serious academic debate about the costs and benefits of
filing shareholder proposals, this would not eliminate the possibility that
nefarious actors enter and manipulate the system in its current state. Even
studies suggesting that shareholder proposals are generally helpful to firm
value would have to square with the fact that a purposely harmful proposal
breaks with the general trend by creating the possibility that the
corporation takes a wrong step. There is no scholarship of which we are
aware that claims intentionally harmful proposals somehow increases firm
value. Additionally, no literature suggests that additional ownership and
disclosure requirements would decrease the value of shareholder proposals
to the firm. Hence, additional regulation would have few downsides, but
could potentially anticipate and prevent a stock manipulation catastrophe
for firms particularly susceptible to suffer declines after receiving a
shareholder proposal.

302. See generally Cuñat, Gine & Guadalupe, supra note 5; Denes, Karpoff & McWilliams,
supra note 5.
303. See generally Cuñat, Gine & Guadalupe, supra note 5.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Opportunistic Proposals,
supra note 5; Matsusaka, Shareholder Approval, supra note 5.
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III. PROPOSED REGULATION
At this point, we hope to have convinced the reader that a significant
gap in SEC rules regarding shareholder proposals exists.308 We have
engaged in a lengthy survey of rules that might govern the conduct of
ill-motivated minority shareholders, yet we could not isolate a single rule
that would prohibit it. Ill-motivated short sellers and other affiliated parties
could easily submit shareholder proposals that lower stock value and then
reap profits from their misconduct.309 What, then, could be done about it?
We propose two additional rules that the SEC, Congress, or the states
(particularly Delaware) might adopt that would prevent the exploitation of
the shareholder proposal system.
First, we would require that shareholders certify and prove that they
hold no short positions in the firm to which they submit a shareholder
proposal. This would also include certifying (but not proving) that family
members, close friends, and business associates do not possess a short
interest. Second, we suggest that the SEC adopt a requirement that the
proponent of a proposal certify that they make the proposal in good faith.
Good faith naturally excludes proposals made for the purpose of extorting
concessions from a firm, attempted stock price manipulation, and other
nefarious purposes (such as filing proposals due to a personal dislike
of the leadership team). Whether the SEC, Congress, or the states
promulgate these rules, shareholders who fabricate documents or make
false representations in meeting these requirements should be held
accountable as strictly as individuals who engage in insider trading or
stock price manipulation.
A. Prohibiting Proposals from Short Sellers
Although short selling is part and parcel of the American stock
market,310 it is not viewed as favorably in other jurisdictions. For example,
many exchanges abroad do not permit short selling of any kind. 311
Furthermore, numerous European jurisdictions, including France, Italy,
Spain, Greece, and Belgium, have enacted short sale bans in an attempt to
stabilize financial markets and improve investor confidence in the wake of

308. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
309. See generally Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5.
310. Brian Beers, Short Selling Basics, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.investo
pedia.com/articles/investing/100913/basics-short-selling.asp [https://perma.cc/8DVS-YNTF].
311. Rupert Neate, Kim Willsher & Juliette Garside, Four Countries Ban Short-Selling to Ease
Market Pressure, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 11, 2011), https://www.theguardian.com/business/
2011/aug/11/short-selling-ban-europe-france [https://perma.cc/GR9M-TQJC]; Is Short Selling
Illegal?, MEISSNER ASSOC. (2020), https://www.secwhistleblowerattorney.net/securities-fraudwhistleblower-lawyer/is-short-selling-illegal/ [https://perma.cc/X8DZ-CKNG].
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the COVID-19 pandemic.312 The common justification for permitting
short-sale transactions in the United States is that it provides flexibility
and profitability not otherwise available to investors. For example,
the existence of call or put options permits traders to take time-sensitive
positions that would otherwise be unavailable to investors in common
stocks, bonds, or other securities.313 This justification alone, even
unaccompanied by the idea that the United States is a country that
values the freedom of contract, seems sufficient to permit the practice.314
That said, it is important to restrict short sellers from engaging in
certain activities.315
The regulation we suggest, implemented via the SEC, Congressional
act, or state law, would prevent individuals with short interests in a
company from filing shareholder proposals. This regulation, if properly
enforced, would almost entirely eliminate the problem we have discussed
in the pages above. If the trouble with permitting almost anyone to file
shareholder proposals is that short sellers may use them to reduce share
value, then a direct ban on these types of proposals from short sellers
should do the trick. After all, the potential for exploitation is rather
obvious, and this remedy would be tailored to the problem it seeks to
address. The short seller would not lose the value of its long or short
positions except to the extent that the seller values its right to make
shareholder proposals. The short seller would still be able to attend annual
meetings, cast votes on proposals submitted by others, cast votes on the
membership of the board of directors, and exercise residual claimholder
rights that accompany the holding of any amount of equity.316
Like all rules, this one is not entirely costless to the regulated: the
short sellers who hold equity interest in a company would partially lose
the ability to influence that company. However, this is not a permanent
loss. It would not be difficult for short sellers to simply close out their
short positions in a particular firm if they wish to take part in the
shareholder proposal process. We suggest giving ample warning that this
rule will apply from a certain date, so all but the most extreme short sellers
will be able to adjust their portfolios accordingly if they deem that
312. Short Sale Bans in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, SHEARMAN & STERLING (Apr. 1,
2020), https://www.shearman.com/perspectives/2020/03/short-sale-bans-in-response-to-the-covid19-pandemic [https://perma.cc/AYN3-9H2W].
313. How to Buy and Sell Put and Call Options, SNIDER ADVISORS, https://www.snider
advisors.com/buy-sell-put-call-options/ [https://perma.cc/PC49-R3DR].
314. Is Short Selling Illegal?, supra note 311.
315. The United States already restricts many short selling activities through various regulations.
Short Sale Restriction (SSR), LIGHTSPEED, https://www.lightspeed.com/trading-basics/short-salerestriction-ssr [https://perma.cc/NZG7-L8ED].
316. See generally Velasco, supra note 1.

748

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 44:707

advantageous. This change might make short selling marginally more
disadvantageous, but it would improve the lot of those holding long
positions in the stock and of the corporation’s leadership team. By
eliminating the possibility that short sellers use shareholder proposals to
hurt the firm, the risks associated with the stock would fall, resulting in a
rise in price. Moreover, management would save a significant amount of
their time and legal costs from dealing with potentially harmful proposals,
possibly raising company prospects in the eyes of the market.317
A regulation that eliminates a potentially profitable short selling
activity will likely face challenges and attempts by parties to circumvent
the regulation. For example, individuals may file nefarious shareholder
proposals with firms where they hold no shorts but where their family
members, friends, and/or business associates hold a short position. Hence,
the regulation should be worded strongly to also prohibit this type of
proposal activity. In fact, a proposal meant to benefit any short position
within the company should be prohibited and potentially punished with
criminal and civil penalties. Otherwise, individuals could sabotage firms
on behalf of others.
These suggestions will, undoubtedly, raise the issue of enforcement.
Regulators can take several steps to detect misconduct via shareholder
proposal and curtail such activity. For example, just as investors must
certify and provide proof of holding at least $2,000 in company shares for
at least three years, investors could be required to certify that they hold no
short interest in the corporation whose governance or operations they seek
to change. This certification would subject individuals who misrepresent
their positions to fraud charges if they fail to make the proper disclosures.
Moreover, brokerages that provide confirmation of the $2,000 three-year
holding requirement can be required to certify that the investor has
accurately stated they hold no short positions in the company.318 This
requirement would allow additional oversight to ensure accuracy.
Of course, as mentioned earlier, an investor who wanted to avoid
detection as a short seller could simply short the security from a different
brokerage account. A second brokerage account means additional
fees—imposing costs to the misconduct that have nothing to do with

317. See generally Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Opportunistic
Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Shareholder Approval, supra note 5.
318. See Roger W. Byrd, SEC Reverses Position Regarding Proof of Ownership for Rule 14a-8
Shareholder Proposals, BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 18, 2011), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/employeebenefits/sec-reverses-position-regarding-proof-of-ownership-for-rule-14a-8-shareholder-proposals
[https://perma.cc/7VZK-GJNV].
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enforcement.319 Most (if not all) brokerages impose a leverage limit on
individuals shorting stocks. 320 A short position, after all, is a position
where the investor borrows a security or an option, instead of money, and
sells it at the market price.321 In return, the investor holds the money
obtained from the transaction in hopes of repurchasing the asset they sold
at a lower price and returning the borrowed asset to the lender.322 This type
of transaction requires a loan, which ordinarily carries interest charges.323
Moreover, and more importantly, brokerages set limits to prevent
investors from taking more risk than they can afford to take.324
These leverage limits protect the brokers and the investors because
without them the investor would potentially incur limitless liability due to
poor bets.325 When the investor is unable to pay and declares bankruptcy,
the burden would fall to the brokerage.326 When the brokerage is unable to
pay and declares bankruptcy, other investors with this brokerage might
lose their money.327 If taken to the extreme, with many investors partaking
in the irresponsible behavior, the activity risks a liquidity crisis—which is
often at the heart of many financial collapses and economic recessions and
depressions.328 That scenario is precisely the rationale for limits on
borrowing to short assets; limits ordinarily based on the amount of assets
an investor holds in a particular account.329
The greater the value of assets in one account, the more room the
investor has to borrow under the margin requirements.330 Therefore,
319. Chad Langager, Why Do You Need a Margin Account to Short Sell Stocks?, INVESTOPEDIA
(Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/05/marginaccountshortsell.asp [https://
perma.cc/7L62-7SUH].
320. Id.
321. James Chen, Short (Short Position), INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.investo
pedia.com/terms/s/short.asp [https://perma.cc/6ARJ-RD4C]; Langager, supra note 319.
322. The investor then pockets as profit the difference between the asset price when they sold it
and the asset price when they repurchased it. Langager, supra note 319.
323. Id.
324. These limits are often legally required. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Such liquidity crises are often at the heart of financial collapses. Press Release, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, SEC Halts Short Selling of Financial Stocks to Protect Investors and Markets (Sept.
19, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-211.htm [https://perma.cc/K2HD-K2S7].
329. Langager, supra note 319.
330. These requirements include concepts like the Regulation T margin and/or portfolio margin.
See Will Kenton, Regular T (Reg T), INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 24, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/r/regulationt.asp [https://perma.cc/2VT7-M85X]; Portfolio Margin, INTERACTIVE BROKERS,
https://www.interactivebrokers.ca/en/trading/marginRequirements/PortfolioMargin.php [https://
perma.cc/EL7Z-FYQB]. We leave the discussion of the concepts and formulas behind these
limitations on trading to other scholars. What is important about these margins is that, given identical
assets in accounts subject to either of these margin rules, the greater the value of the assets within the
account, and the more room the trader has to take out margin loans.
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splitting accounts just to short a particular security, while simultaneously
filing proposals intended to harm that security, adds additional cost to the
nefarious activity. If the investor is diversified in their investments and
strategy, they would need to maintain a separate $2,000 account for every
stock they wish to harm by way of proposal while shorting that stock in a
different account.331 Eventually, this would become so cumbersome that
the small market declines in stock price may not be worth shorting for
some investors, even if they could create those declines through nefarious
shareholder proposals.332 Therefore, adding the requirement that each
brokerage certify the investor’s eligibility to make shareholder proposals
based on short positions would hamper at least the marginal stock
manipulator from engaging in the activity. Some individuals might simply
create a large number of $2,000 accounts for the express purpose of
shareholder proposals, but this regulation cannot hope to stop all
misconduct.333 The existence of such accounts, however, could serve as
strong circumstantial evidence that the shareholder is misbehaving.
Shareholder intent may be difficult to prove and, even with the aid
of search warrants, private accounts may be difficult for investigators to
access. Thus, opponents might suggest that this rule would only serve to
chill the legitimate exercise of shareholder rights without dissuading the
individuals actually gaming the system.334 Whether it would truly chill the
exercise of shareholder rights might be a difficult argument to advance,
because so few shareholders exercise this right even without the
restriction—the SEC typically receives only a few hundred filings per year
seeking a no-action letter regarding a shareholder proposal.335 This number
should be compared to the tens, if not hundreds of millions, of individuals
who might otherwise qualify to file shareholder proposals due to their
long-standing ownership of at least $2,000 in a particular stock.
Hence, policymakers should not concern themselves with chilling a right
so rarely exercised.336
331. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
332. Shareholders are limited to only one proposal per annual shareholder meeting. Id.
333. Id.
334. Ganesh Setty, Shareholders Would Have Tougher Time Submitting Resolutions Under
SEC’s Proposed Rule, CNBC (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/05/rule-change-wouldmake-it-harder-to-submit-shareholder-resolutions.html [https://perma.cc/P3S3-GH6R].
335. SEC Proposes Amendments, supra note 160; 2015 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2016
No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2017 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2018 No-Action Letters,
supra note 160; 2019 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2019–2020 No-Action Responses, supra note
160.
336. SEC Proposes Amendments, supra note 160; 2015 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2016
No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2017 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2018 No-Action Letters,
supra note 160; 2019 No-Action Letters, supra note 160; 2019–2020 No-Action Responses, supra note
160.
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The lack-of-detection argument remains, however, and it is one that
can be raised against almost every criminal or civil law or regulation.
Enforcement is difficult work, and it would be hard to determine the
number of culprits that actually escape the clutches of enforcers.337 After
all, not only is it difficult to know whether an offense has been committed,
but it is difficult to ascertain the number of people involved. We cannot
even formulate a detection rate for virtually any white-collar crime
because we can never know the denominator of that equation.
Similarities exist between provisions barring stock price manipulation
through shareholder proposals and crimes like insider trading and
stock manipulation.338 Perhaps we should at least attempt to enforce
these regulations intended to reduce instances of traders “burning” their
own property for the “insurance” money they would receive on account of
their shorts.
With respect to insider trading, we are confident that it occurs more
often than it is reported, and finance scholars often write papers about its
likelihood in various instances.339 However, in many cases, insufficient
proof of misconduct exists resulting in few arrests.340 This will probably
be true with stock manipulation through shareholder proposals.
Nonetheless, the existence of a regulation or statute against it on the books
will give regulators the power to seek evidence, obtain search warrants,
and prosecute individuals who brazenly violate the rules of the
marketplace. If nothing else, at least this regulation would eliminate open
exploitation of the process.
B. Adding a “Good Faith” Requirement
We propose shareholders be held to a good faith requirement. It
would be a step in the right direction if we illegalized short selling a
security while simultaneously sending in shareholder proposals, thus
reducing the possibility of stock manipulation. However, unscrupulous
traders may find other reasons to lower the price of a company that is
unconnected to shortselling. Companies may be sabotaged by shareholder
337. Tom Dreisbach, Under Trump, SEC Enforcement of Insider Trading Dropped to Lowest
Point in Decades, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/08/14/901862355/
under-trump-sec-enforcement-of-insider-trading-dropped-to-lowest-point-in-decade [https://
perma.cc/8X6G-7UPL].
338. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2021).
339. Thomas Franck, Insider Trading Is Still Rampant on Wall Street, Two New Studies Suggest,
CNBC (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/14/insider-trading-is-still-rampant-on-wallstreet-two-news-studies-suggest.html [https://perma.cc/3PNY-WJ93].
340. Why Insider Trading Is Hard to Define, Prove and Prevent, WHARTON SCH. U. PENN. (Nov.
11, 2009), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/why-insider-trading-is-hard-to-define-proveand-prevent/ [https://perma.cc/9Y3U-QN4N].
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investors in exchange for collective bargaining agreements, to advance an
agenda entirely incompatible with company policies, and/or to harm a
company incompatible with a particular ideology.341 The existence of
these possibilities creates the need for a good faith requirement that, if not
met, should lead to the exclusion of a particular proposal from the ballot
at the annual meeting. This would, at the very least, prevent short sellers
from citing as an excuse some alternative motive other than the deliberate
attempt to devalue the stock.
It is true that good-faith requirements are notoriously difficult to nail
down.342 The definition of “good faith” is frequently an open question for
scholars and practitioners. Some definitions contain contradictory terms,
while others omit terms that might properly be included, and others say
more about the phrase than necessary.343 We would adopt the following
definition: honesty and the absence of any intent to defraud, harm, or act
maliciously toward the corporation, its management, or any of its
shareholders. This does not greatly vary from the definition of good faith
already employed in corporate law.344
Of course, the existence of this definition still leaves some questions
about what the term means when applied to shareholder proposals. Hence,
we suggest that violations of this requirement not result in any criminal
prosecution. Instead, companies can request a no-action letter based on a
lack of good faith, and the SEC can issue no-action letters with respect to
proposals found, by a preponderance of evidence, to be in bad faith. This
would still leave the shareholder the option of litigating the matter in civil
court, if the shareholder believes otherwise, while protecting the company
from having to spend time dealing with clearly harmful proposals on the
day of the shareholder meeting.345

341. Harming a company through a particular ideology may include environmental activists
buying oil stocks only to flood them with proposals about closing all oil-drilling facilities. See
generally Bebchuk, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka,
Opportunistic Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Shareholder Approval, supra note 5; Cuñat, Gine
& Guadalupe, supra note 5; Denes, Karpoff & McWilliams, supra note 5.
342. See, e.g., Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968); Daniel S. Kleinberger, From
the Uniform Law Commission: In the World of Alternative Entities What Does ‘Good Faith’ Mean?,
A.B.A. (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2017/
03/ulc/ [https://perma.cc/97BP-2WX6].
343. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 342; Kleinberger, supra note 342.
344. “[G]ood faith . . . A state of mind consisting in (1) honesty in belief or purpose, (2)
faithfulness to one’s duty or obligation, (3) observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in a given trade or business, or (4) absence of intent to defraud or to seek unconscionable
advantage.” Good Faith, BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
345. See generally Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Opportunistic
Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Shareholder Approval, supra note 5.
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A civil recovery against the bad faith shareholder proponent should
be available, which the company would be able to raise as either a cause
of action or a counterclaim in the event of a shareholder lawsuit.
After all, nefarious actors deliberately attempting to damage the
governance of a company is a real threat, whether they do so out of a desire
to profit from short selling or otherwise.346 This cause of action would
create at least some deterrence for shareholders who do not act blatantly
enough to be criminally responsible but who do not have the corporations’
best interests in mind.347
Permitting a corporation to sue the shareholder on the grounds of bad
faith would be a major step away from current corporate law. However,
the shareholder burden to avoid liability is low: All the shareholder has to
do is file a claim in good faith, or at the very least, not in bad faith. The
corporation would have the burden of proof to demonstrate that the
shareholder acted in bad faith, and we suggest a heightened burden above
the “preponderance of the evidence” standard typically used in civil
proceedings.348 Given the need to protect shareholder rights, it should be
necessary that the company show by “clear and convincing evidence” that
the proponent of a proposal acted in bad faith.349
This suggestion raises the bar from what would be necessary to prove
to the SEC that a proposal should be excluded. Right now, the SEC need
only be convinced of the lack of good faith by a preponderance of the
evidence.350 In an action for damages against the activist shareholder, the
plaintiff corporation would have to establish bad faith by clear and
convincing evidence. This would greatly increase the corporation’s burden
346. Matsusaka, Opportunistic Proposals, supra note 5.
347. We should note that omitting criminal liability for violating the good faith requirement is
quite important. Given the hard-to-define nature of what “good faith” is, we would strongly oppose
extending anything beyond civil liability to individuals accused of filing shareholders proposal without
good faith. As we have argued in prior works, American prisons are already too full to permit
unrestrained prosecutors from twisting the good faith requirement to pursue the unpopular. William
N. Clark & Artem M. Joukov, The Criminalization of America, 76 ALA. LAW. 224 (2015); Samantha
M. Caspar & Artem M. Joukov, The Case for Abolishing Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity on Equal
Protection Grounds, 49. HOF. L. REV. 315, 347–48 (2021); Samantha M. Caspar & Artem M. Joukov,
Mental Health and the Constitution: How Incarcerating the Mentally Ill Might Pave the Way to
Treatment, 20 NEV. L.J. 547, 577 (2020) (“The United States is the world leader in incarceration.”).
Moreover, criminalizing proposals for their contents may even rise to the level of viewpoint
discrimination, which the First Amendment prohibits. Artem M. Joukov & Samantha M. Caspar,
Comrades or Foes: Did the Russians Break the Law or New Ground for the First Amendment?, 39
PACE L. REV. 43, 79 (2018).
348. Preponderance of Evidence Explained, VALIENTE MOTT BLOG (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://valientemott.com/blog/blog-preponderance-of-evidence/ [https://perma.cc/Y53Y-44EX].
349. CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, Westlaw Glossary (database updated 2021).
350. Russell G. Ryan, The SEC’s Low Burden of Proof, WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2013),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323297504578582213820533922 [https://
perma.cc/4XYW-V2R8].
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of proof and hopefully remove any fear felt by shareholders of the
possibility that they may be sued for nefarious shareholder conduct.
Therefore, many shareholder proposals might be properly excluded by the
SEC for lack of good faith without precluding bad faith litigation and
without guaranteeing that the shareholder would be liable. An additional
fees provision could be imposed upon the corporation if it loses:
In the event the corporation brings such litigation against a shareholder but
does not prevail, the shareholder’s costs and attorney’s fees should be paid
by the corporation.
CONCLUSION
This Article has surveyed the various rights and duties of
shareholders, board members, and corporate executives with respect to
shareholder proposals and has identified a loophole in the rules that
permits stock price manipulation.351 Current regulations permit
shareholders to short the very corporations to which they submit
shareholder proposals.352 This loophole allows bad faith actors to
potentially influence the corporation’s governance and the way markets
perceive the corporation’s future prospects.353 Because economic and
financial studies indicate shareholder proposals may be harmful to
corporations, we suggest at least two additional rules.354
First, we suggest that individuals certify and partially prove that
neither they nor their relatives, business affiliates, or close friends hold (to
the shareholder’s knowledge) a short interest in the corporation. Failure to
follow this rule should be subject to criminal, civil, and perhaps even
administrative penalties, similar to how the SEC and other federal agencies
currently handle cases of insider trading and security manipulation.355
Second, proposals filed by shareholders must be filed in good faith. This
rule, which would be accompanied by only a civil penalty (assuming the
company can establish a violation under a heightened burden of proof),
351. See generally SPAMANN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 1; Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988); Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955); In
re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., 2012 WL 729232 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012); Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d
503 (Del. 1939); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del.
2009); Weinberger v. UOP., Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858
(Del. 1985); In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); DEL. CODE tit. 8,
ch. 1.
352. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2020).
353. See Langager, supra note 319.
354. See generally Matsusaka, Shareholder Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Opportunistic
Proposals, supra note 5; Matsusaka, Shareholder Approval, supra note 5.
355. See Swiers, supra note 248.
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would serve as a catch-all provision to exclude proposals from annual
shareholder meetings that might be intended to harm the company.
Adding these rules by statute or regulation should secure stocks from
manipulation by shareholder proposals and perhaps help market outcomes
for all participants.
Undoubtedly, the rules we propose are not perfect and would not
prevent all shareholder misconduct with respect to proposals.
Nevertheless, the current gap in SEC regulation of malicious proposals
leaves more to be desired. Even though the SEC is apparently aware of
this problem, the recently implemented measures do not address the
problems that unrestrained shareholder proposals pose for companies.356
Therefore, policymakers should consider additional steps to resolve the
conflict. The rules we suggest above could be helpful in preventing stock
price manipulation and ensuring that a small minority of shareholders in a
given corporation do not use their activism to harm the other shareholders
and the company as a whole.

356. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8; see also Clayton, supra note 7; Lee, supra note 7; Roisman, supra
note 7; Leaf & Bartlett, supra note 7.

